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Abstract 
This project deals with the study of how civil actors can exercise resistance and generate 
legitimacy through information communication technologies (ICTs) and the potential hereof 
in international conflicts. As this subject is relatively unexplored within conflict 
transformation, Manuel Castells' theory of communication power as well as various research 
articles on the Arab Spring in Egypt is used to explore ICT in socio-political change. This 
theorization is then transferred to a context of conflict transformation exemplified by the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
The study shows that ICTs helped promoting the protesters legitimate demands through 
facilitating collective action while revealing the regime's illegitimacy via global networks and 
public space. In conflict transformation these mechanisms could be of value when mobilizing 
for non-violent action and generating legitimacy through global networks. Likewise ICTs 
could be used to challenge cultural violence such as pluralistic ignorance and securitization 
through citizen journalism.   
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Introduction 
“There is a sense of optimism and confidence that the transformative impact of the web is only in 
its early stages and presents an unparalleled opportunity and challenge for conflict resolution 
globally” (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 367).  
Different scholars have expressed great optimism about the transformational potential of 
communication and information technologies1 (ICTs) with regards to democratization 
(Shirazi, 2008), global problem solving (Tapscott, 2011) and international conflict 
transformation. Regarding the potential of peace-building Kofi Annan2 for example states that 
ICT could be of great value at the level of knowledge-sharing and mutual understanding and 
thus; “ICTs can help address the root causes of violent conflict” (Annan, 2005: iii).  Within the 
terminology of the peace researcher, Johan Galtung, knowledge and mutual understanding 
could potentially challenge cultural violence which is the legitimation of other forms of 
violence making them seem right and solidified as acceptable in society (Galtung, 1991).  
The emergence of new media offers possibilities for new interactive engagement beyond one-
way communication that invites a variety of actors to share their messages. Although the 
Internet provides new possibilities for states to control and maintain power it likewise gives 
room for networks of businessmen, activists, terrorists and ordinary people to enter the 
political scene challenging the traditional structure of legitimacy.  
In the words of Professor of Sociology Manuel Castells this development provides new 
potential for counter-power affecting a parallel “widespread crisis of political legitimacy” 
(Castells, 2007: 244). Since communication shapes the production of power, the 
multidimensional flow of communication from many-to-many generates new power 
formations characterized by being networked, transnational and horizontal (Castells, 2012).  
One could argue that the transformation of the public space not only enables civil actors to 
challenge legitimization of violence but also presents new possibilities for generating 
legitimacy through nonviolent collective action and global networks. Both dimensions could 
                                                          
1 The expression can also include Television and cellphone technology. Through our use of it we put emphasis on 
Internet communication, social media and the interaction and integration of telecommunications (telephone 
lines and wireless signals)  
2 Served as the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1997-2006 
6 
 
be of significant importance in the transformation of international conflicts perhaps especially 
in asymmetric conflicts like in Israel-Palestine where political negotiations seem to have 
reached a deadlock. 
Despite the fact that ICTs are considered to present a paradigm shift within conflict 
transformation (Berghof, 2012) the topic remains relatively unexplored academically and by 
practitioners (Gilboa, 2009: 88). While some research has been conducted on ICTs in relation 
to peace education (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 363), violence mapping and prevention (Bock, 
2012) and online dialogue (Karatzogianni, 2006: 434), few scholars have explored the 
potential of ICTs for challenging cultural violence and organizing nonviolent action as 
mechanisms of conflict transformation.  
In order to examine how counter-power exercised through ICTs can challenge legitimacy the 
events of the Arab Spring in Egypt (with starting point in Tunisia) will serve as an analytical 
platform for investigation. Due to the widespread use of ICTs for collective action and 
information-sharing during the series of events in Egypt the uprisings can be considered an 
unprecedented opportunity to test and further develop theories about ICTs and socio-political 
transformation (Aouragh, 2011). Through comparing and combining a variety of articles on 
the subject we will extract concepts of relevance for conflict transformation structured 
around three analytical themes; collective action, public space and global networks. On the 
basis of this analytical framework we will discuss how counter-power, legitimacy and ICTs 
can supplement the theory of conflict transformation in terms of mobilizing for nonviolent 
action and challenging cultural violence, exemplified with Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 
Research question 
How can counter-power exercised through ICTs generate legitimacy and how can this contribute 
to conflict transformation in terms of mobilizing for nonviolent action and challenging cultural 
violence?  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Methodology  
This section contains a short explanation of our optic including our scientific theoretical 
approach and the perspective of social constructivism. This section outlines how the project 
combines the notion of counter-power through ICTs with conflict transformation. Moreover, 
the role ascribed to the empirical research-articles utilized in both the analysis and the 
discussion will be clarified followed by an explanation of our choice of focus on the Arab 
Spring and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.     
 
Theory of science  
The optic of the project is informed by social constructivism which is a broad scientific field. 
The basic assumption is of epistemological nature namely that reality is formed by our 
realisation of it. It also points to the fact that societal phenomena are results of historic and 
social processes and thereby changeable (Rasborg, 2009: 349). The overall components of 
social constructivism in this project amounts to; anti-essentialism; anti-realism; knowledge as 
cultural and historic specific; language as constructing reality and finally; social interaction 
between dynamic social processes rather than more static social structures (Rasborg, 2009: 
350-351). It is likewise conditioned by our interest in generating knowledge about how civil 
actors can influence legitimacy with the use of ICTs. The question is what new internet 
technologies signify to specific equations of power relations to different forces, groups or 
individuals’ attempting to influence and challenge authority (Dean, 2008: 309).  
 
The focus on conflict transformation presupposes a normative standpoint with regards to the 
transformation of international conflicts in a nonviolent manner that includes various levels 
of society, comprising the grassroots level. Conflict transformation is chosen on the basis of its 
relevance of bottom-up approaches when it comes to ICTs and the legitimacy of civil actors.  
Thus, the frame of the project transcends the optic of government rationalities: 1) because 
complex, international conflicts involve a variety of actors beyond borders and governmental 
actors and 2) because it is assumed that civil actors could play a significant role in conflict 
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transformation enhanced by ICTs. Since communication conditions relational power struggles 
the framework of networks and communication power is the specific optic.  
 
Perspective on the Internet 
Ramsbotham et al. explain how the Internet was developed inspired by cybernetics3 with the 
intention to connect humanity beyond borders. Thus, they argue that the Internet from the 
very beginning was developed as a cosmopolitan tool for peaceful purposes (Ramsbotham et 
al., 2011: 366). While recognizing the potential of the Internet to be used for violent objectives 
they state that “the internet opens up a uniquely global or cosmopolitan space, which 
peacemakers can use as a potent tool for an environment within which to educate, advocate and 
problem-solve” (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 363). Although this project focuses on the 
constructive use of ICTs and thus explores the potential pointed out by Ramsbotham et al. this 
focus does not imply a deterministic view of the Internet as neither inherently democratizing 
and peace-generating nor the opposite. Rather than providing a thorough analysis of ICTs in 
international conflicts, the objective of this project is the ways in which ICTs could be a tool 
and space for challenging cultural violence and promoting nonviolent action.  
 
Investigating the role of ICTs in sociopolitical change many scholars take point of departure in 
a dichotomy between online and offline worlds considering the Internet as merely a tool that 
could be used for changing the “real world” (Moore et al., 2012: 28). In this project the 
internet is rather considered an important dimension of everyday life and thus “a set of 
resources, engagements, relations and structures through which the world is constantly 
renewed” (Moore et al., 2012: 36). This among other things imply that the use of ICTs in the 
Arab Spring is not merely to be measured in relation to whether or not it mobilized people to 
the “offline” public space, but more so as an expression of cultural change in itself.  
 
Generative theory 
Kenneth Gergen operates with a social constructivist approach to research termed generative 
theory that, as the name indicates, focuses on generating theory through new models, 
perspectives and concepts. From a constructivist perspective language is not simply a 
                                                          
3 A science studying systems of various nature which are capable of receiving, storing and processing 
information in order to use it for control 
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reflection of reality rather it is seen as world-constituting. The same goes for research 
particularly within social science. Even descriptive research is considered made up of 
paradigms that contribute to the construction of reality. Hence, science shapes reality 
whether the researcher is aware of it or not and for this reason, “science can no longer 
extricate itself from moral and political debate” (Gergen, 1996: 373). This gives great 
responsibility to researchers and has methodological consequences. Positivist research 
approaches of measuring reality in the search for objective answers are rejected. Instead the 
aim of research is to challenge current paradigms and open up for new ways of perceiving 
things: “Rather than "telling it like it is," the challenge for the postmodern scientist is to "tell it as 
it might become." Needed are scholars willing to be audacious, to break the barriers of common 
sense by offering new forms of theory, of interpretation, or intelligibility” (Gergen, 1996: 371).  
Gergen is not very concrete about the specifics of how such generative approach to research 
should be constructed. Rather than strictly guiding our line of argumentation generative 
theory serves as a methodological inspiration and legitimization of our intention to expand 
the concepts of nonviolence and cultural violence within the paradigm of conflict 
transformation. 
 
Method and reading guide 
This section clarifies the choices made that determine which dimensions become visible and 
invisible in the analysis and discussion with regards to: 1) pointing out concepts about 
information and communication technologies and how civil actors generate or influence 
legitimate power (analysis) and 2) supplementing these concepts to theory of conflict 
transformation (discussion). The idea is to extract the important concepts and ideas of 
research on the Arab Spring and hereafter discuss them in relation to conflict transformation. 
Additionally this section functions as a reading guide to the project and explains the choice of 
empirical examples of the Arab Spring and the Israeli-Palestine conflict. 
 
Having clarified the meta-scientific approach which determines the investigation chapter two 
contains a conceptual clarification of conflict transformation through founder of Peace and 
Conflict studies, Johan Galtung and Professor of International Peacebuilding John Paul 
Lederach. Moreover we clarify the concept of legitimacy through sociologist Max Weber in 
order to move into the field communication power and the global network society presented 
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by Professor in Sociology and Communication Technology Manuel Castells. The conceptual 
clarification establishes the theoretical foundation for addressing the research question and 
provides the theoretical focus for analyzing the ways in which legitimacy is negotiable within 
the global network society.  
 
In chapter three the analysis of the relationship between legitimacy, ICTs and networks 
based on the events from the uprisings in Egypt takes form.  The purpose is to answer the first 
part of the research question: How can counter-power exercised through ICTs generate 
legitimacy? The question will be addressed through analysing various arguments on ICTs in 
the Arab Spring in Egypt. The method in the analysis corresponds to a research survey; 
comparing and combining different articles that test assumptions on the influence of the 
Internet. Using the 2011 Egyptian Revolutions as point of reference for scientific arguments 
gives us a possibility to evaluate their actuality and scientific weight. The extraction of 
concepts and ideas is conditioned by the criteria that they shed light on the relation between 
ICTs and the generation of legitimacy. 
 
The theory of Castells is used throughout the analysis to challenge and further deepen the 
argumentation.  Inspired by Doctor of Philosophy and Sociology Daniel P. Ritter (et al.) and 
political scientist Marc Lynch4 the analysis is structured around categories of collective action, 
public space and global networks. These themes serve to separate the otherwise intertwined 
process of local, national and global actors trying to generate and/or influence legitimacy 
through different media. Moreover, the themes correspond with the potential for ICTs in 
conflict transformation with regards to nonviolence and practices of challenging cultural 
violence through ICTs. The following model illustrates how the three concepts are 
interconnected and interdependent. 
                                                          
4 As well as Director and Associate Professor at Institute for Middle East Studies, George Washington University 
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Collective action focuses on the significance of ICT in mobilization and connecting people. To 
explore this theme the following scholars will be consulted5: Zeynep Tufekci, Assistant 
Professor at the Center for Information Technology Policy, who puts forward the perspective 
of how pluralistic ignorance can be challenged through ICTs; Media scholar, blogger and 
Internet activist Ethan Zuckerman6; Bruce Bimber, Professor of Political Science and 
Communication who claims that new media makes it possible to organize in spite of weak ties 
and no leadership; Journalist and Director Charlie Beckett7 who argues for the networkability 
and rapidness of new technologies; Malcolm Gladwell, journalist and critical against the 
‘Facebook revolutions’ and its superficial level of commitment; Mohammed Rashed brings a 
participant’s account from Tahrir Square; Sahar Khamis, Assistant Professor at Department 
of Communication who states that these new types of media acts as effective tools for 
promoting civic engagement and lastly; Political scientist Marc Lynch who identifies four ways 
in which ICTs promote collective action.  
 
The section Public space centers around the relationship between old and new media and how 
it creates new spaces, based on arguments presented by; Anthropologist Miriyam Aouragh 
(et al.) who focuses on mobility, grassroots activism and online communities – she argues that 
ICT is both a tool and a space; Simon Cottle, Professor of Media and Communication, focuses 
on already established media such as Al Jazeera in order to conceptualize the interaction of 
ICTs, old as new; Sociologist Saskia Sassen argues that when online spaces of revolution 
                                                          
5 Some scholars are utilized in more than one section as they embrace various arguments influencing our 
analysis. They will however only be presented once and only the most visible ones in the analysis and discussion, 
respectively. 
6 Director of the Center for Civic Media at MIT, Massachusetts.  
7 The founding director of POLIS, the journalism and society think-tank at the London School of Economics’ 
Media and Communications Department. 
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becomes rooted in a space of place (Tahrir Square) the social thickness of a movement 
consolidates itself.   
 
The last section Global networks shows the changing relations between global, local and 
military actors as a consequence of but also in some cases contributing to collective action. 
Besides the already mentioned scholars we consult Doctor Daniel P. Ritter (et al.) in 
Philosophy and Sociology who provides an argument about the Iron Cage of Liberalism; and 
Sociologist and Communication researcher Philip N. Howard (et al.) who supports this with 
the notion of the international buy-in.  
 
In chapter four conflict transformation as put forward by Galtung and Lederach enters the 
project again.  The section will address the second part of the research question regarding 
how the generation of legitimacy through ICTs can contribute to conflict transformation in 
terms of mobilizing for nonviolent action and challenging cultural violence. First of all, 
nonviolence and cultural violence will be problematized in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. In this relation a number of scholars will be consulted; Véronique Dudouet, 
researcher at Berghof Conflict Foundation, underlines that legitimacy of the weaker part in 
asymmetric conflict can be obtained through nonviolent collective action; Palestinian 
American writer and political analyst Youssef Munayyer as well as Freelance journalist Ben 
White look into previous nonviolent actions of Palestinian struggle and how future actions 
might become more successful through ICTs.    
This leads to a discussion on nonviolent action and the contradictions between mass-
mobilization and fundaments of conflict transformation followed by an examination of global 
awareness as a dimension of establishing legitimacy. For this part of the discussion the 
scholars presented are;  Rut Sobrino8, who praises the development of ICTs and states that 
they had a great impact on the Palestinian situation as global awareness has been evoked and 
the people have become involved; Journalist Joe Klein, on the other hand, illuminates that as 
long as the Palestinians are presented as suicide bombers and not practitioners of 
nonviolence mass movements the balance are not likely to tip in favour of the Palestinian civil 
                                                          
8 Head of the Department of Audiovisual Communication and Development, UNESCO Centre of Catalonia-
UNESCOCAT. 
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society; Journalist Bilal Ghaith9 further emphasizes the major role that the Internet plays 
when displaying Palestinian suffering; Journalist Mathew Schwartz provides the perspective 
on hacker-activism through activities by Anonymous.   
 
Subsequently follows a discussion of discursive transformation, together with de-
securitization and pluralistic ignorance. Herein, the following arguments will be presented; 
Hannah Reich, associate researcher at Berghof Conflict Foundation, will build on the 
argument that when employed in ways of consideration, the media can affect to post-war 
peace-building; Rabea Hass, Research Associate at Hertie School of Governance argues that 
the Israeli media contribute to the securitization of the conflict; Sofia Santos Lecturer at 
School of Communication Netanya Academic College presents peace media as a tool for de-
securitization; In continuation hereof, Claudia Aradau, Senior lecturer in International 
Relations defines the notion of de-securitization through claiming universal rights and 
democratic procedures.  
 
Finally, we address the potential of citizen journalism through the following scholars; Stuart 
Allan (et al.), Professor of Journalism focuses on citizen journalism and human rights 
violations and states that online news reporting creates discursive spaces for engagement; 
Assistant Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication Naila Hamdy presents citizen 
journalism and the significance of independent coverage of the dynamics in a conflict; Ibrahim 
Shaw, senior lecturer in Media and Political displays the significance of alternative media and 
argues that this form of peace journalism challenges the objectivity paradigm; Sanjana 
Hattotuwa, Senior researcher at Centre for Policy Alternatives argues that ICTs create 
coherence between the different levels of society in conflict transformation.  
 
Choice of case-examples 
The empirical examples from respectively the Arab Spring and Israel-Palestine are not to be 
understood as cases. Thus we do not account for the entire historical background and do not 
go into causal explanations. Rather, we are interested in certain situations and ways of 
                                                          
9 Ghaith works at WAFA, a local Palestinian news agency as an economics reporter and editor.  
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creating legitimate power through ICTs using the two examples to analyze and exemplify 
theoretical statements.  
 
The choice of focusing on what has become known as the Arab Spring10  is mainly based on 
the huge attention these events have attracted, not only politically and in media but also 
scientifically. As Aouragh et al. argue; “the political turmoil and ongoing revolutions in the Arab 
world provide an unprecedented opportunity to finally test theoretical assumptions about the 
Internet (…) The revolutions have become a social laboratory” (Aouragh et al., 2011: 1345).  
We do not subscribe to total explanations of ‘Why did the Arab Spring occur?’ The point is that 
the Arab Spring has created not only the focus but also an incredible amount of empirical data 
for analysing ICT and how civil actors might generate legitimacy. Using the term “Arab Spring” 
we mainly look at events in Egypt and only sporadically in Tunisia thereby not paying 
attention to the uprisings in the remaining MENA region. This choice is based on the amount 
of articles about the use of ICTs in Egypt as well as the complexities involved in the violent 
dimensions of e.g. the events in Syria and Libya. At the same time, the whole Arab Spring is a 
focus in itself e.g. in terms of the way ICTs helped spread the sentiment of outrage and belief 
in the possibility of political change (Castells, 2012: 53-83).  
 
Using the conflict in Israel-Palestine as an example the objective is not to explore the great 
complexity of the conflict but rather to illuminate the possible expansion of legitimate power 
from state to civil actors in relation to conflict transformation.  
Firstly, the example of Israel-Palestine is chosen on the basis of its comparability with the 
Arab Spring compared to other parts of the world because of the similar Arabic cultural 
traditions, access to ICTs and religious values. Secondly, the Israel-Palestinian conflict is an 
asymmetric conflict where one party is particularly stronger than the other and thus 
collective action and nonviolence are valuable tools for transformation. Thirdly, the Israel-
Palestinian conflict is a contemporary, contracted conflict that involves many parties 
internationally and thus is of great importance for global politics. We mostly use examples 
concerning the Palestinian struggle to gain political legitimacy and challenge cultural violence 
in Israel (Dudouet, 2011). 
                                                          
10 Keeping in mind that the Arab spring was multi-seasonal we use the term the “Arab Spring” rather than “Arab 
uprisings” or “Arab revolution” because it has become the most generally used name. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Conceptual clarification 
This chapter clarifies the theoretical perspective that constitutes the approach in the analysis 
and the main concepts in our research question; nonviolence, cultural violence, legitimacy, 
counter-power and communication (ICT). Firstly, an account will be given of the field of 
conflict transformation in order to set the frame of the project and show how the focus on 
cultural violence and nonviolence could reach further heights through information 
communication technologies. In relation to this a clarification of Manuel Castells’ thoughts on 
communication power and networks will follow, including theoretical aspects on legitimacy. 
This is pivotal since our objective of interest is; how the networked communication structure 
might allow new ways of counter-power and legitimacy.  
 
Introducing the field of conflict transformation  
Conflict transformation is a complex, multi-dimensional concept that entails a broad 
estimation and interrogation of the interaction of societal and political processes. In the 
following we elaborate on the concept of nonviolence, cultural violence and asymmetric 
conflicts to end up identifying points for further inquiry with regards to ICTs and counter-
power. As Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach are considered some of the most important 
theorists within the field of conflict transformation, the focus is mainly on their perspectives 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 9).  
 
Peace-building from below 
Lederach began using the term conflict transformation rather than conflict resolution because 
“resolution carried with it a danger of co-optation, an attempt to get rid of conflict when people 
were raising important and legitimate issues” (Lederach, 2003: 3). With the change in framing 
Lederach added another dimension: the inclusion of grass-roots in addition to formal 
diplomacy at the governmental level and informal diplomacy with NGO’s, journalists and 
academics.  Conflict transformation considers both process and structure-orientation 
embracing transformation from below where solutions derive from local grassroots and 
community-based organizations (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 222).   
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Diplomacy can take place at three levels in society: Track One, Two and Three. The top level 
(Track One) includes the key players in the conflict; politically, militarily and religiously. The 
middle-range leadership (Track Two) is not necessarily connected to official governmental 
movements and serves as an important connection between the top and grassroots levels.  
The grassroots level (Track Three) represents the masses and often includes those involved in 
local communities, those who experience a daily struggle to find food, water, shelter, and 
safety in violence-torn areas.   
 
Lederach identifies an interdependence gap in traditional conflict resolution stating that other 
approaches to peace-building have belittled the importance of strengthening the relationship 
between the different tracks. He emphasizes the importance of relationship-building 
simultaneously at all levels; in both a vertical capacity (across divisions that exist between 
groups with different levels of power), and in a horizontal capacity (across divisions within 
groups with similar levels of access to power) (Lederach, 1999), (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 
26).   
Lederach stresses that conflict transformation views peace as rooted in the quality of 
relationships: “Many of the skill-based mechanisms that are called upon to reduce violence are 
rooted in the communicative abilities to exchange ideas, find common definitions to issues, and 
seek ways forward toward solutions” (Lederach, 2003: 21-22). In order for a dialogue to 
happen processes and spaces must be created so that people can shape the structures that 
instruct their community life. Thus, developing communication skills and platforms is of great 
importance.  
 
Violence, peace and conflict 
Within the field of conflict transformation violent actions as a means to an end are completely 
dismissed. Conflict, on the other hand, is not dealt with in a purely negative manner. Conflict 
can be understood as something constructive for a society to go through in order to transform 
(Lederach, 2003: 5).  
According to Johan Galtung violence is caused by unresolved conflict and polarization which 
leads to dehumanization. He emphasizes that conflicts have to be resolved nonviolently 
ending the cycle of ‘violence breeding violence’ (Galtung, 2005). Galtung defines peace as the 
opposite of violence, not war as one may think; creating peace means reducing varies 
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expressions of violence (Galtung, 1996: 2).  The ABC model of conflict was developed by 
Galtung in the late 1960’s and consists of three dimensions A) Attitude, B) Behavior and C) 
Contradiction (see figure below11). The attitude describes the enemy images or mistrust; 
behavior can be different actions of violence and contradiction refers to the clash of interest 
which is understood to be the root cause of the conflict. Conflict transformation implies 
transforming attitude into empathy, behavior into nonviolence and contradiction to creativity. 
   
 
A similar idea from Galtung is his distinction between direct, structural and cultural violence 
(see figure above). If it is possible to indicate an actor who intends certain violent actions then 
it is direct violence; physical violence. Galtung expands the concept of violence to include 
violence imbedded in the structures of society such as human rights violations and hunger. He 
labels this structural violence. Direct and structural violence is legitimized by cultural violence 
which amounts to the norms and ideas of e.g. religion, ideology, language, science, media and 
education. Cultural violence could e.g. be the cast system, patriarchy, racism or colonialism 
and as opposed to direct violence it is not visible. Galtung links cultural violence to political 
power and the legitimization hereof;  “just as political science is about two problems – the use of 
power and the legitimation of the use of power – violence studies are about two problems: the 
use of violence and the legitimation of that use” (Galtung, 1990: 291). Galtung is not very 
specific when it comes to challenging cultural violence except emphasizing that it is difficult to 
do so (Galtung, 1996: 271). Others have explored the potential of addressing cultural violence 
through: education (Coskun, 2008), media (Bratic, 2004), peace journalism (MCGoldrick et al., 
2005), and dialogue programs (Kose, 2009). Yet, no research has shed light on the 
transformational potential of ICTs in this respect.  
                                                          
11 (Galtung, 1996: 72) 
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The distinctions between cultural, structural and direct violence link to the terms positive and 
negative peace. Negative peace can be defined as the absence of direct violence whereas 
positive peace implies overcoming both structural and cultural violence (Ramsbotham et al., 
2005: 11). 
 
While dialogue is seen as the main tool for conflict transformation this approach has been 
criticized in asymmetrical conflicts where dissimilar parties12, under-dogs and top-dogs, are 
divided by “the very structure of who they are and the relationship between them” 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2005:24). The critique is that mediation/negotiation, dialogue and 
problem-solving approaches are insufficient as they presuppose equivalence and therefore 
might even reinforce the power hegemony (Ramsbotham et al., 2005:59). Ramsbotham et al. 
points out that asymmetric conflict may not be transformed without overt conflict due to the 
need for structural change which is not in the interest of the top-dog. There are different 
approaches to transforming the unequal relationship. One category focuses on different ways 
of empowering the underdog through nonviolence and the other focuses on removing the 
props that support the position of the top-dog such as international recognition and 
legitimation of violence (Ramsbotham et al., 2005:25).  
 
Nonviolence and a culture of peace 
Nonviolent resistance is an integral dimension of conflict transformation as the two share a 
common commitment to the transformation of structural violence, social change and justice 
obtained through peaceful means (Dudouet, 2008: 2). Nonviolence is usually a part of track 3 
(cf. peace-building from below) activities and can be combined with other methods of peace-
building such as mediation to transcend the root causes of a conflict and transform the violent 
structures (Reimann, 2004: 52), (Brand-Jacobsen, 2005: 4). Methods of nonviolent protests 
can be speeches, petitions, art, hunger strike and other public assemblies.   
Galtung distinguishes between negative and positive nonviolence arguing that “negative 
nonviolence demands acts of omission -no more violence- and positive nonviolence invites acts of 
commission, for peace” (Galtung, 2011). Negative nonviolence implies e.g. toppling a dictator 
with the use of civil disobedience and demonstrations.  
                                                          
12 The dissimilar parties might be comprised by minority/ majority or state/non-state actors (Ramsbotham et al. 
2005:59).  
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Using positive nonviolence includes the opposing party as far as possible in the solution - 
attacking structures rather than individuals. Galtung identifies five crucial dimensions of a 
Gandhian tradition of nonviolence: 1) to define the conflict and your own visions clearly and 
attempt to understand the goals of the other party, 2) to see conflict as an opportunity for 
transformation, 3) to refrain from polarizing but recognizing the difference between 
antagonism and antagonist, 4) to solve the conflict through negotiating with the opponent 
empathizing with his position and 5) to seek solutions through conversation rather than 
coercion that involves all parties. Galtung’s argument is that both negative and positive 
nonviolence is needed for peaceful transformation (Galtung, 2011). 
 
Positive nonviolence corresponds with the concept of a culture of peace. Kai Frijof Brandt-
Jacobsen argues that social movements, despite their positive cause of democracy, peace or 
justice, end up demonizing “the other” and focusing on either/or categories (Brandt-Jacobsen, 
2012: 5). A more constructive approach would be to apply principles of a culture of peace 
such as not only focusing on the leaders and creating enemy images but understanding the 
structures and relational power within which the conflict emerge. Lederach likewise 
emphasizes the importance of embracing complexity arguing that conflict transformation 
requires “a quality of interaction with reality that respects complexity and refuses to fall into 
forced containers of dualism and either-or categories.” (Lederach, 2005: 35). 
 
Within the framework of Galtung and Lederach conflict transformation presents itself as a 
theory of bottom-up peace-building focused on creating positive peace and improving 
relationships between conflicting parties as well as between different tracks in society.  
Asymmetric conflicts require steps of power-balancing before mediation can be effective and 
just. These steps imply empowerment of the underdog through nonviolence and removing the 
props that upholds the power of the top-dog. These props could e.g. be the legitimation of 
violence, cultural violence.  
Galtung is not very specific about how cultural violence could be challenged. Our first point 
for further inquiry is how this process could be strengthened by ICTs. The second point of 
interest is to generate knowledge on how civil actors can mobilize non-violently against 
structural violence through communication networks. 
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As pointed out by Galtung (cf. violence, peace and conflict) cultural violence corresponds with 
the notion of legitimate power.  The following therefore entails a short presentation of 
legitimacy which subsequently will be linked to Manuel Castells’ theory of new 
communication technologies and counter power. 
 
Conditions for legitimacy 
The focus on legitimacy lays the foundation to investigate the sub-question; how might 
political oriented actions become legitimate when infused in ICT?  Weber’s account for 
political legitimacy is essential because it highlights the power of ideas and norms with 
regards to the relationship between governing and the governed. In a conflict transformation 
perspective, as outlined above, legitimacy is crucial in relation to understanding cultural 
violence.  
Traditionally, legitimacy is intrinsically bound to state institutions as an explanation to the 
question; what is needed in order to assure social order and on which ground is authority 
accepted? One of the main points of legitimacy is that authority obtains and maintains 
political power through creating consent and mutual understandings of rightfulness. Weber 
tried to “classify authority relationships according to the particular rationale for attributing 
legitimacy to command and obedience” (Matheson, 1987: 199). Thus, through the concept of 
legitimacy rationalities are ascribed great significance in the structure of domination. 
Legitimacy entails a double perspective; looking at how actors seek to legitimize or 
delegitimize certain institutions and authorities; and whether people accept authority. 
Following this perspective, rationality is either the means to make authority rightful (the 
perspective of the governing) or the basis of compliance with authority (the perspective of the 
governed) (Matheson, 1987: 199).  When speaking about governing it is important to 
remember that many different forces in society fight to influence governance which Weber 
designates political oriented actions (Dean, 2008: 309).  
As critics have pointed out, Weber defined legitimacy from the viewpoint of the rulers and not 
the ruled (Matheson, 1987: 206). While he does consider power elsewhere in society he does 
not develop a framework on how civil actors might generate legitimate power. Weber’s 
conceptualization is therefore not sufficient to understand how civil actors can influence 
legitimacy.  
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Our focus on civil actors is conditioned by the ideal of nonviolent action combined with the 
emphasis of transforming cultural violence. As we look beyond the rationality of state 
authority and into the perspective of how civil actors might generate counter-power through 
ICTs we look into Castells’ network and communication power theory.  
 
Communication power 
According to Castells the evolving logic of ICTs enables individuals and organizations to 
interact everywhere, any time. In this manner the boundaries between offline and online life 
are blurred in such a way that networks transcends barriers of time and space. This 
constitutes what Castells terms the global network society, a society where the social 
structure is powered by networks of digitally produced information and communication 
technologies (Castells, 2009: 24). 
  
Networks can be defined as a set of interconnected nodes13. In a communication network each 
of these nodes’ function and meaning depend on the other programs of the network and their 
interaction (Castells, 2009: 19).  A network is constructed around goals holding the different 
components together (Castells, 2009: 21). The strengths of the network are to be found in 
their flexibility, adaptability and capacity to self-reconfigure when linked to available 
technologies. Not everybody is included in the global network but everyone is affected by 
their processes in terms of markets, management, transnational production, science and 
technology, the mass Media and the Internet networks of interactive communication etc. 
(Castells, 2009: 25).  
In the network society communication has become faster and potentially more interactive as 
it can directly transfer context based experiences and emotions, hopes and ideas (Castells, 
2009: 54-55). Communication is the condition for construction of meaning and the production 
of power relationships. Since the possibilities for communication has transformed in the 
network society so have social movements. The pace, mode and theme of communication 
between potential social movement actors have changed. The new features of communication 
is the possibility of self-generated content, self-directed in deduction and self-selected in 
                                                          
13 Nodes are components of a network, the specific function and meaning of a node relies on the program of the 
network to which it belongs and its interaction with other nodes. The importance of a node increases when it 
absorbs relevant information and processes it more effectively (Castells, 2009: 19-20).  
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reception by many that communicate with many (Castells, 2007:248).  This mass-self 
communication creates possibility of reaching a global audience through p2p networks and 
Internet connection (Castells, 2012:15). Thus, the communication that (re)construct local and 
global public mind is by and large autonomous of origin (Castells, 2007:248). This is why the 
social movements of the global network society are ‘new species’ (Castells, 2012: 15).  
 
While this brings a shift of focus towards power relations14 from the public sphere to new 
communication spaces (Castells, 2007), the new social movements does not only use the 
virtual space. Rather they operate in a composite of what Castells frames the space of flows 
and the space of places (Castells, 2007: 250). Whereas space of places refers to actual physical 
spaces, the space of flows “links up distant locales around shared functions and meanings on the 
basis of electronic circuits and fast transportation corridors, while isolating and subduing the 
logic of experience embodied in the space of places” (Castells, 2001: 149). 
 
Legitimacy of the network state 
Castells describes power as both discursive and based on violence. The state exercises power 
through: 1) coercion, here meaning the monopoly of violence be it legitimate or not and 2) the 
construction of meaning and control of people’s minds by means of symbolic manipulation 
(Castells, 2012: 5). Hence, Castells focuses on the governing of people through discourses in 
societal institutions and how these work to affect and control the way people think (Castells, 
2012: 5). This is backed by the monopoly of violence but he cautions that exercising violence 
is not only less effective but might also imply the loss of legitimacy. Therefore the state works 
with the goal of maintaining power through values and norms (Castells, 2009: 16). Bringing 
matters to a head:  “If the majority of people think in ways that are contradictory to the values 
and norms institutionalized in the laws and regulations enforced by the state, the system will 
change” (Castells, 2012: 5). 
 
In the network society the position of the state is challenged. First of all, the global networks 
of corporations, international institutions and social movements threaten national power and 
sovereignty. However, the state survives by becoming a network state that “engages itself in 
                                                          
14 It should be mentioned that not only civil actors but also corporate and mainstream media and state networks 
can invest in new communication spaces.   
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networking with other states, and with the power-holders in the decisive networks that shape 
social practices in their territories while being deployed in the global realm” (Castells, 2009: 
51).  In this sense governmental power depends on strategic networks interested in the 
benefits of the state’s capacity to exercise violence as well as legitimacy within international 
relations. 
Secondly, the conditions for legitimacy changes to such an extent that Castells speaks of a 
growing crisis in political legitimacy where people globally loose trust in their government 
(Castells, 2007: 244 and Castells, 2009:16). Castells directly draws parallels between the 
“exposure to political corruption and the decline of political trust” because it “can be directly 
related to the dominance of media politics and the politics of scandal in the conduct of public 
affairs” (Castells, 2009: 289). While a number of studies display a consensus about the 
decrease in the societal and institutional trust, there is a general debate over the role of the 
media in this process (Ibid). What Castells draws from this is how the distrust affects political 
participation the citizenry. Castells argues that there is a general tendency “to increase social 
mobilization outside the political system” (Castells, 2009: 294) as an alternative to traditional 
political participation. This can be reached through the Internet’s increasing role in facilitating 
both independent mobilization and direct linkage between parties and potential supporters.  
 
Power in the global network society 
Communication is seen as the central condition in the shaping of people’s minds which is why 
Castells turns to global media to theorize how new mass media and global communication-
channels might be used to challenge and generate legitimacy (Castells, 2009: 53). He 
underlines that the processes of power-making must be seen in a two-fold perspective: 1) 
processes that re-enforce established domination or seek to obtain structural positions of 
domination or 2) processes “that resist established domination on behalf of the interests, values, 
and projects that are excluded or under-represented in the programs and composition of the 
networks” (Castells, 2009: 47).  
 
Castells operates with four categories of power: networking power, network power, 
networked power and network-making power. In each of these types of power Castells has a 
specific focus of analysis including that of inclusion/exclusion, social coordination and 
gatekeeping strategies (Castells, 2009: 42-43).  
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Out of Castells’ four categories our main focus is on network-making power as it describes how 
networks enter political arenas making claims on legitimacy. Network-making power entails 
the capacity to exercise control over others depending on two mechanisms: 1) the ability to 
constitute network(s), and to program/reprogram the network(s), in terms of the goals 
assigned to the network; and 2) the ability to connect and ensure the cooperation of different 
networks by sharing common goals and combining resources, while fending off competition 
from other networks by setting up strategic cooperation (Castells, 2009: 45). Castells labels 
the ones constituting the networks programmers and the holders of power positions 
switchers.  
 
Programmers and programming is context specific to each network. A common trait remains 
that ideas, visions, projects and frames generate the programs and these are cultural 
materials (Castells, 2009: 46).  In the network society culture is mostly embedded in 
communication and ideas are processed accordingly to how they are represented in the realm 
of communication.  
The switchers hold the position of connecting points between various specific networks. 
Castells does not point to a power elite or anything this stable, but the establishment of more 
subtle, complex and negotiated systems of power enforcement (Castells, 2009: 47).  
The mechanisms of switching and programming often work at interface between various 
social actors who are defined in terms of their social position in a social structure and in their 
organizational framework of society. Exercising power in the network society demands a 
complex set of joint action going beyond alliances (Castells, 2009: 45). 
 
Castells defines countervailing networks and counter power as “the deliberate attempt to 
change power relationships” that “happens through reprogramming networks around 
alternative interests and values, and/or disrupting the dominant switches while switching 
networks of resistance and social change” (Castells, 2012: 9). This means that resistance is 
achieved through the same two mechanisms as dominance; programs and switches. 
Counter-power derive from social movements and civil society, be that local, national or 
global. Usually, the networks of power are global while the resistance is local and the key 
strategic question is “how to reach the global from the local, through networking with other 
localities” (Castells, 2009: 52).  
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Summing up points for further inquiry  
Asymmetrical conflicts refer to situations where dissimilar parties are divided by the 
structure of who they are and the relation between them. Cultural violence designates the 
ideas and norms that make repression, exclusion, discrimination and direct violence 
legitimate (for certain actors in specific contexts), and non-violence is the suggestion as to 
how civil actors might influence and change a conflict situation. 
The concept of legitimacy makes it clear that the relations of dominations are justified and 
maintained through rationalities. State actors have a privileged access to proliferating and 
institutionalizing such ideas. Castells makes clear that new possibilities of communication and 
information exist; possibilities that civil actors might use making grounds for attempting to 
switch of certain connections between dominating networks. If civil actors succeed in grass-
rooting spaces of flows this might create connections to other networks to support and put 
pressure on conflicting parties.  
Summing up on conflict transformation and communication power two things become clear: 
1. Though the network society presents new potential for collective action and social 
movements, it is not explored how civil actors could use new technologies for nonviolent 
mobilizations in international conflicts, 
2. A relation of domination or authority in an asymmetrical conflict is upheld by the 
discourses that leaders use to legitimize their position in other words; cultural violence. A 
relational power concept comprising counter-power through ICTs remains unexplored in 
conflict transformation 
The primary focus in the analysis will be how countervailing action benefits from and 
influence on communication spaces affecting the public mind.  Looking at the media as the 
social space where power is decided to understand how legitimacy moves from an 
institutional framework to networking communication spaces. These direct flows can 
potentially reach local and global active audience who again are able to redistribute content. 
 
 
 
26 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
The significance of ICTs 
It is widely disputed to what extend ICTs were significant in the Arab Spring. On the one hand, 
it is argued that ICTs were irrelevant if not counterproductive (Morozov, 2011) while the 
other extreme praises ICTs as almost a panacea (Shirky, 2009). Most scholars attempt to go 
beyond this polemic discussion pointing towards the complex nature of the events (Aouragh 
et al., 2011), (Ritter et al., 2011), (Diani, 2011). Just as it may seem uninformed to assume that 
ICTs played no role in the Arab Spring it would likewise be naïve to argue that the uprisings 
would have been impossible without these technologies (Ritter et al., 2011:2). Be that as it 
may, the objective of this project is the ways in which ICTs actually could change the course of 
events in non-violent uprisings and influence legitimacy. As Aouragh et al. stress; the ongoing 
revolutions in the Arab world provide an excellent opportunity to test theoretical 
assumptions about the Internet (2011: 1345).   
Inspired by Ritter et al. and Lynch the analysis centres around three significant dimensions of 
ICT’s with regards to non-violent revolutions; collective action, public space and global 
network. The focus is how ICTs can challenge pluralistic ignorance, mobilize faster than the 
old media, create spaces of mobilization, function as a tool for information sharing and in 
corporation with the old media operate as channel for global resistance and awareness. 
 
Collective action 
One of the indicators of the significance of ICTs can be found when asking why previous 
uprisings in the Arab world did not succeed or at least had this big effect before 2011 
(Tufekci, 2011a). In other words: what are the mechanisms that previously supported years 
of dictatorship and what did suddenly allow citizens to rise against their government? Tufekci 
identifies the collective action problem as one of the dynamics that help dictators maintain 
power and argues that this can be transcended with the use of ICTs. Lynch identifies five ways 
in which ICTs made collective action easier in Arab Spring; 1) by lowering the costs of 
transaction, 2) by creating informational cascades, 3) by increasing the costs of repression, 4) 
by creating scale and diffusion effects and 5) through new possibilities for movement 
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organization (Lynch, 2011: 304). Our primary focus in this section lies within point 1, 2 and 5 
while we will come back to point 3 and 4. 
 
The collective action problem 
Tufekci argues that the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia previously succeeded on the basis of a 
collective action problem where democratic change could only happen through collaboration 
of many, but where the risks that followed being ‘the first one to act’ were very high. In this 
way, new tools for communication and coordinating collective action can be seen as a game-
changer because it allows a large number of people to e.g. organize a demonstration with 
lower risk for individuals to initiate and support it than previously (Tufekci, 2011a). In 
relation to this Tufekci refers to game-theory where the well-known example of prisoner’s 
dilemma15  shows how people are unlikely to collaborate if the risks are high except if they get 
to talk together (Ibid.).  
 
Tufekci further stresses that “social media lower barriers to collective action by providing 
channels of organization that are intermeshed with mundane social interaction and thus are 
harder to censor” (Tufekci, 2011b). This corresponds with Ethan Zuckerman’s so-called ‘cute 
cat theory’ that illuminates the significance of social media by pointing towards the fact that 
dictators have the opportunity to censor a great deal of online material. But the moment they 
attempt to censor channels such as Facebook or YouTube where people usually share pictures 
of cute cats and other depoliticised phenomena it creates even more attention and thus 
potentially support the message which was supposed to have been censored (Zuckerman, 
2009). In Egypt the regime cut off all internet and mobile-phone connections early on 28th of 
January “aware of the rallying power of communications technology” (Rashed, 2011: 23). At 
this point, however, demonstrations had already been organized and the cut off turned out to 
have quite the opposite effect (Aouragh, 2012: 532). 
  
                                                          
15 Prisoner’s dilemma refers to a well-studied model in game theory. Two criminals held in custody are told they 
can leave as a free man if they confess and their partner does not or if neither confesses. They will, however, be 
punished badly if their partner confesses and they do not. “The logical option would be for both to “detect” and 
confess for fear the other one would; this seemingly logical outcome is actually to the detriment of both, who 
would have been better off of if neither confessed” (Tufekci, 2011a). 
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In continuation hereof Bimber et al. argue that new media not only transform the potential for 
collective action but require a reexamination of traditional collective action theory; “new 
forms of collective action reliant on certain technological aspects illuminate several 
fundamental aspects of all collective actions that so far have remained theoretically obscure” 
(Bimber et al., 2005: 366). Traditional theories of collective action focuses on the need for 1) 
choices of participation based on strong ties and vanguards and 2) organization based on 
strong leadership and division of labor. With ICT it is possible to mobilize on the basis of weak 
ties and no leadership (Bimber et al., 2005). In fact this networked structure characterizes 
contemporary collective action. Thus, efforts of collective action should rather be seen as “a 
set of communication processes involving the crossing of boundaries between private and public 
life” (Bimber et al., 2005: 367). In the following we look into the value of the network 
structure of non-violent uprisings. 
 
The power of networks 
The network-making power that Castells presents as essential in the global network society 
came to be vividly expressed during the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. The movements 
established during the uprisings were very diffuse and horizontal of nature which made them 
difficult to break. They had an organic strength, not as organizations – they were networks 
(Beckett, 2011). The new tools of technology and communication can function independently 
and in networks (Ibid.). 
 
Gladwell on the other hand skeptically analyses the networks arguing that massive 
participation through ICTs only fosters a superficial level of commitment (Gladwell, 2010: 
47); “The world, we are told, is in the midst of a revolution. The new tools of social media have 
reinvented social activism [however] [t]he platforms of social media are built around weak ties” 
(Gladwell, 2010: 45). The only strength to be found in these weak ties is the possibility for 
people to exploit the power of the distant connection with ones ‘hundreds of friends’ on 
Facebook as a source of new ideas and information (Gladwell, 2010: 45). Gladwell concludes 
that weak ties rarely result in high-risk activism and that Internet activism diminishes in-the-
streets activism. High-risk activism requires deep roots and strong ties (Ibid.) and history 
shows us that activism should be understood as more than weak tie networks (Gladwell, 
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2010: 44). What mattered back then were the personal connections as seen e.g. in the civil-
rights movement in the US16.  
 
Disproving Gladwell’s argument, the actions up to and during the Arab Springs show that 
high-risk personal involvement in social mobilization is very much alive in today’s social 
movements despite the networked formation. An example is the Egyptian April 6 youth 
movement17 who in 2008, via a Facebook page, called on people to wear black and stay home 
on the day of the strike, alert their networks about police activities, organize legal protection 
and draw attention to their efforts18.  The movement continued operating during the uprisings 
in 2011 and prompted the January 25th demonstrations19 (Rashed, 2011: 23). Their modus 
operandi was through ICTs, primarily Facebook and Twitter, and their social networking 
space functioned not only as meeting points but also as a source of information and 
instrumental in mobilization. Thus Internet spaces made flows of information from few to 
many and from many-to-many possible, a perspective the notion of pluralistic ignorance 
elaborates on. 
 
Pluralistic ignorance and mass self-communication 
In the following we will look into pluralistic ignorance/preference falsification, a dimension 
that Lynch elaborates on under “informational cascades” as “the most intriguing hypnosis 
about the effects of social media” (Lynch, 2011: 304). This is significant as it reveals the 
mentality behind collective action. 
 
Pluralistic ignorance occurs when the majority of people agree on a certain issue but refuse to 
share this perspective because they believe themselves to be a minority and thus fear 
violating a social norm. In this way a spiral of silence is created where nobody share their 
discontent with e.g. an oppressive regime because they do not know that others share their 
                                                          
16 He bases his arguments on examples from 1960 under the American black/white segregation in society and 
expresses that activism back then challenged the status quo and attacked deeply rooted problems.  
17 An activist group started in spring 2008 to support the workers in an industrial town protesting against low 
wages and high food prices. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/inside-april6-movement/  
18 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/inside-april6-movement/  
19 ‘The Day of Revolt’; Nationwide demonstrations protesting the Mubarak regime which also turned out to be 
the first day of the occupation of Tahrir Square. By the end of January 25th, many Egyptians had been injured, 
hundreds had been arrested and several had died as they were faced with brutal police response. 
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opinion. With ICTs this spiral can be turned into a spiral of action because people have the 
possibility to discuss politics online and can see that a particular cause like We are all Khaled 
Said is ‘liked’ by thousands of people. Tufekci states that “a public is not created just because 
everyone individually holds an opinion but because there is multi-level awareness of other 
people's views leading to a spiral of action and protest” (Tufekci, 2011a). In this way ICT can be 
a tool for challenging pluralistic ignorance by enabling people to communicate relatively safe 
and make visible that they are not the only ones unsatisfied with the regime and showing up 
at Tahrir Square.  
Castells does not take into account the perspective of pluralistic ignorance and how this might 
exactly ‘hide’ that the majority of people disagree with the institutionalized norms. However, 
his theory complements Tufekci’s point by explaining how ICTs enable ordinary people and 
social actors to challenge the position of those in power by contributing to the “shaping of 
people’s minds”.  
 
Castells believes the construction of meaning in the human mind to be shaped by 
communication and thus, “the transformation of the communication environment directly 
affects the forms of meaning construction, and therefore the production of power relationships” 
(Castells, 2012: 6). With the emergence of ICT the power structures have changed. Rather 
than having one or few channels through which the government can control people’s mind the 
internet allows potentially everybody to participate in the collective construction of meaning. 
Castells coins this development mass self-communication because it, on the one hand, can 
reach masses just like Television and on the other hand can be characterised as self-
communication because the sender autonomously decides the message.  
This type of horizontal, many-to-many communication not only enables people to share 
information about their grievances and thereby mobilise them but moreover allows people to 
overcome fear and create togetherness that cultivates collective action. While a social 
movement might have roots in unmet needs and grievances of a population the actual birth of 
social movements is, according to Castells, initiated by emotions and the transformation 
hereof into action. Like Tufekci, Castells argues that the reason why the social movements of 
the Arab Spring did not happen before was because of fear, but different from Tufekci he 
emphasises how the internet can cultivate both rage and connectedness and thus help people 
overcome this anxiety.  
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In this way, Castells turns to the human psychology to explain how social movements emerge. 
He explains how people at first might be enthusiastic about creating change hoping for a 
better future but that these feelings will be challenged by the fear of opposing dominating 
power structures. To overcome this fear Castells points towards both togetherness and anger 
as mobilizing factors because it encourages risk-taking behaviour. Whereas previous social 
movements were dependent on less effective means of communication such as pamphlets, 
roomers, mouth to mouth communication or the press, contemporary movements can be seen 
as a ‘new species’ due to their possibilities enabled by ICTs and global networks. Castells 
emphasizes the importance of ICT stating that “the faster and more interactive the process of 
communication is, the more likely the formation of a process of collective action becomes, rooted 
in outrage propelled by enthusiasm and motivated by hope” (Castells, 2012: 15). ICT’s can 
facilitate the creation of togetherness and at the same time mediate a spark of indignation into 
rage and anger simultaneously in a large number of people, e.g. a history about Mohammed 
Bouazizi setting himself on fire due to injustice20.  
 
Thus, Castells points towards two necessary conditions for collective action; 1) that the 
message resonates with the experience of the receivers of the message and 2) effective 
communication channels. In the case of the Arab Spring, Castells draws parallels to how ICTs 
helped spreading the message of revolution from Tunisia across borders and encouraged 
hope and enthusiasm in the rest of the Arab world (and in Europe and the US with the 
Indignadas in Spain and Occupy Movement in the US21). We will come back to the 
transnational and international effects of ICTs in the section of global networks.  
 
                                                          
20 Bouazizi was a Tunisian street vendor who sat himself on fire in December 2010, in protest of the continuously 
confiscation of his fruit selling cart where he was trying to sell fruits and vegetables. Authorities confiscated his 
products and Bouazizi sat himself on fire and passed away because of his severe injuries 
(http://www.ibtimes.com/story-mohamed-bouazizi-man-who-toppled-tunisia-255077).   
21 The Spanish Indignadas movement took place from May 2011 to May 2012 and protested against the political 
decisions being taken by the government cutting deeper into health, education and social services at the same 
time as unemployment reached 22 percent (February 2011). What started as a small network of concerned 
citizens on Facebook national and global demonstrations soon took place all convened over the Internet 
(Castells, 2012: 110-115).  
The Occupy Wall Street movement outplayed from February 2011 to March 2012 and concerned the spiraling 
depth of the economic crisis. Inspired by the occupations seen on Tahrir Square in Egypt Adbusters, a 
Vancouver-based journal of cultural critique, posted a call to occupy Wall Street September 17th 2011. 1000 
people showed up the first day and the number following increased (Castells, 2012: 156-162).   
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Although the perspective of Tufekci and Castells generally supplement each other there is a 
subtle difference in the way they perceive the mechanism of mobilization. Whereas Tufekci 
frames e.g. the Arab Spring as though people where simply not aware that others disliked the 
regime Castells put more emphasis on the fact that people did not have the means to 
communicate properly to mobilize. Castells further indicates that the broad support of regime 
change was initiated and organized by some of the protesters although this spark of 
indignation of course had to resonate with a sentiment in the society. This reveals an 
interesting dynamic of how the movements on the one hand was based on perceived 
grievances in the society and at the same time was constructed through communication and 
formed by the initiators. 
 
Khamis et al. help clarify how the level of public critique of the regime was very different in 
the case of Egypt compared to the case of Tunisia. In Egypt there was a well-established 
culture of online criticism of the regime that in many ways helped prepare the ground for the 
revolution. In Tunisia it was the reverse situation where there was a lot less public expression 
of dissent online as well as offline before the revolution. Based on this they argue that “it was 
not a matter of knowing, or not knowing, how their fellow citizens felt about the regime” but 
rather a matter of considering the risks related to participation (Khamis et al. 2011: 9-10). 
Likewise Lynch argues that pluralistic ignorance was much more important in Tunisia than in 
Egypt (Lynch, 2011).  
 
Summary 
Tufekci takes point of departure in ICT as a tool that enables new forms of collective action 
because it is safer to mobilize online and because social media are harder to censor due to its 
parallel function for mundane purposes. Moreover she shows how ICTs can help challenge 
pluralistic ignorance by creating a consciousness among people that they are not alone with 
their opinion and can unify around their cause. Castells, on the other hand, puts more 
emphasis on the speed of the new media compared to previous means of communication and 
thereby the potential to organize and mobilise much faster. He further investigates human 
emotions as an important factor of social movements and thereby social change indicating 
that new media can play an important role in connecting people in outrage thereby enabling 
them to overcome their fear and transform hope into action.  
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Public space 
In this section we will focus on the emergence of connections between new media and 
mainstream media. The objective is to understand how the interaction between new media 
and satellite broadcasters constitutes a public space. Lynch stresses that the public sphere22 
may be the space where state control is getting challenged on its ability to dominate since the 
public sphere with the rise of networked communication undermines its ability to legitimate 
its rule (Lynch, 2011: 306). The new information environment allows an empowered political 
and social activism where people can gain access to information beyond state surveillance and 
control; where they can organize, learn and engage (Lynch, 2011: 307).  
Accordingly, we will analyse conceptualisations that evolve around the street, spaces and 
tools because it is the multimodal communication space that constitutes the new global public 
sphere (Castells, 2008: 90).  
 
The synergy of satellite broadcasters and new social media 
Lynch argues that from its origin Al Jazeera23 began to construct new space for political 
communication and produced a new kind of Arab public space that broke the state’s ability to 
control the flow of information and helped unify an Arab public political space (Lynch, 2011: 
302). Aouragh et al. agree that the Internet should not be contemplated isolated. They take it a 
bit further as they seek to conceptualize a specific interaction of mainstream media and social 
media. They focus on “the shift in media architecture exposed by the powerful synergy between 
social media and satellite broadcasters” (Aouragh et al., 2011: 1345).  
Aouragh et al. underline a dual function of media and mediation; to shape public opinion and 
also to organize. Here Al Jazeera is superior in forming public opinion and of course the 
Internet and mobile texting is better tools for organizing (Aouragh et al., 2011: 1351). The 
point of reconfiguration of media architecture happened when the office of Al Jazeera in Cairo 
was attacked24, its reporters arrested and their press cards revoked. Hereafter ‘at the scene’-
reporting was difficult and relied heavily on Facebook, YouTube and local bloggers. In this 
way Al Jazeera were depended on online sources and ICTs (Aouragh et al., 2011: 1351). 
                                                          
22 Lynch utilizes the term public sphere 
23 The Satellite Channel of Al Jazeera was launched on November 1st 1996. 
http://middleeast.about.com/od/mediacultureandthearts/a/me0080313.htm  
24 February 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/feb/04/al-jazeera-office-attacked-egypt-protests  
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Twitter additionally turned out to be the space for initial contact between mainstream media 
journalists and activist (Aouragh et al., 2011: 1351).  
This contact and new establishment of information channels became even more apparent 
because of the government shutdown. With no Internet and no mobile phone networks, 
activists, bloggers and journalists organized to provide information for global media. Activists 
collected it and transmitted it electronically or physically. Along the way media camps were 
set up on Tahrir Square and material that had been collected as well as new incoming material 
was posted and afterwards disseminated e.g. through Al Jazeera. Especially the ubiquity of 
mobile phones with camera was an important factor for collecting content (Aouragh et al., 
2011: 1352). In the following we will look more into ICTs as a space and tool 
 
ICT as a space and tool 
Aouragh (2012) and Aouragh et al. (2011) argue that ICT is both a tool and a space, and relate 
this to how ICT is embedded in different moments of the revolution. Instead of approaching 
ICT by looking at Internet or networks to be multimodal as Castells (Castells, 2012: 56), they 
look at dialectics between offline and online political action (Aouragh et. al., 2011: 1345), 
(Aouragh, 2012: 519).  
Investigating the Arab Spring Aouragh argues that ICT was embedded in revolutionary stages 
with differentiating offline and online actions which help to understand ICT and activists’ 
potential to tip scales. She further argues that the Internet is indeed a factor but not the most 
dominant when creating change which she relates to the fact that political networks are first 
and foremost consolidated offline. None the less, for a particular stratum of activists and 
participants in the uprisings the Internet had the function of counter-hegemonic spaces which 
is spaces of dissent or as Castells put it spaces of resistance (Castells, 2012: 58). 
 
The different functions of ICTs in relation to the revolutionary stages were both of space and 
of tool. In the first stage of the revolution collective critique of political and social 
establishment was articulated in such spaces whereas in the moment of revolution, for 
example on the 25fth of January25, online updates worked to plan safest routes of marches etc.  
                                                          
25 ’the Day of Revolt’ (Castells, 2012: 52) 
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(Aouragh, 2012: 531). According to Castells this was the double function of ICT in the Arab 
Spring, ICT was the original space of resistance and mobilisation as it was too dangerous to go 
on the street (Castells, 2012: 56). Videos were sent out about the self-immolation of Egyptians 
along with the request of joining the march on the 25fht of January.  
 
One can draw parallels between online/offline political action and what Gladwell labels 
traditional and online activism. He makes a distinction between traditional activism and the 
current online version; social media activism does not concern the kind of hierarchical 
organization as was seen within civil-rights movements (Gladwell, 2010: 48). Via online 
activism networks are built around loose and undefined ties. Conversely, boycotts and sit-ins 
are examples of high-risk strategies that leave little room for conflict and error; “the moment 
even one protester deviates from the script and responds to provocation, the moral legitimacy of 
the entire protest is compromised” (Ibid.). Gladwell argues that the networked social 
mobilization shifts the energy away from organizations that promote strategic and disciplined 
activity towards a media environment that promotes resilience and adaptability (Gladwell, 
2010: 49). The media environment within the Arab Spring, none the less, proved that the so-
called adaptability came to signify a strong durability amongst the protesters to occupy public 
space e.g. Tahrir Square as the activists “planned the protests on Facebook, coordinated them 
through Twitter, spread them by SMSs and webcast them to the world on YouTube” (Castells, 
2012: 58). Moreover the online space came to be highly utilized as online activism where it 
was possible to provoke the anger in people through online documentation of violence so 
when Egyptians were asked to demonstrate against the police they were ignited and ready 
(Castells, 2012: 58).  
 
In continuation hereof Aouragh points to the social networking spaces, such as We are all 
Khaled Said26 or the blog of the Sandmonkey27, as both meeting points and sources of 
forwarded mobile texting, emails, Tweets and shared postings on Facebook. This way the 
social media played the role of a space for social life, a space where young Egyptians could 
become more connected and consolidated in their political dissatisfaction. Aouragh stresses 
                                                          
26 June 6th 2010; Blogger Khaled Said is beaten to death by Egyptians authorities. Following, the Facebook 
group; “We are all Khaled Said” started by Egyptian Google Executive Wael Ghonim. 
27 Sandmonkey is a nick-name for a blogger who narrated the revolution as it unfolded on Twitter. “The Twitter 
voices included activists who were very prominent in the physical movements” (Aouragh, 2012: 532). 
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that in revolution the fact of repetitions are of utmost importance to create agitation to 
motivate people, in this case to go to Tahrir and subsequently to solidify political analysis to 
see the need to stay at Tahrir and ultimately the organisation hereof. This replicates what 
Aouragh calls the trio-characteristic of revolutionary political organising: Educate-agitate-
organize (Aouragh, 2012: 531). That links to the importance of emotional/cognitive power 
when at the tipping point of a revolution; “without the innumerable video files provided via 
Facebook and YouTube by ordinary people, the revolutions would not have been documented 
[and therefore: experienced] with the same intensity” (Aouragh, 2012: 531).  
 
Based on the arguments of Aouragh et al. and Castells we can conclude that ICT played quite a 
significant role both as tool and space. As space it was important as ignition and as a space of 
resistance and dissent. For an important layer of Egyptian opposition activists the Internet 
became a space of dissidence and this furthermore became a space for connecting to other 
segments of the population through connecting social networks, internet networks and 
mobile networks (Aouragh et. al., 2011: 1348), (Castells, 2012: 58).  
 
Spaces of flows  
The idea that ICT is relevant for constituting a space of resistance through global networks 
has been further elaborated by Castells, with his concepts of spaces of flows (Castells, 2012: 
57). Castells argues that the essential form of the movement(s) of the Arab Spring was the 
occupation of public space (Castells, 2012: 59). He uses the term of space and distinguishes 
between cyberspace and urban space. His main argument is that it is the merging of these 
spaces that made the difference. ICT and media attention allowed for a hybrid between these 
two spaces which is the new public space (Castells, 2012: 60). What the Internet does is to 
extend the territoriality from the space of places to the spaces of flows (Castells, 2012: 61). 
This can be seen when the Internet makes itself visible in public space by occupying spaces 
while showing and creating togetherness and thereby the overcoming of fear. As this signifies 
that by joining an occupied site you are a part of “us” (Castells, 2012: 10-11). For example it 
was observed during the uprisings on Tahrir Square that regime supporters entered the 
square attacking protesters, which strengthened a sense of ‘us’ (anti-regime protesters) and 
‘them’ (pro-regime groups, dressed as plainclothes police officers, but also ordinary Egyptians 
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who saw the revolution as a threat to security and stability)28 (Rashed, 2011: 25). In this way, 
the street functioned as a social and political space cultivating the social thickness of the 
movement (Sassen, 2011: 574).  
 
The Internet likewise created a political space, a hybrid space between Internet social 
movements and occupied urban space, the impetus of this space is that it allows and fosters 
autonomous communication (Castells, 2012: 11). The internet functioned as symbolic power 
since occupying had an element of reclaiming the streets and could borrow from symbolism in 
occupied places and its history (Ibid.). Castells main example is Tahrir Square where media 
camps were made and where networks worked together and overlapped in the effort of 
collecting content, mostly mobile collected videos of events taking place (Castells, 2012: 59-
61).  
 
Much like Auoragh and Cottle, Castells emphasises that big media networks, such as Al 
Jazeera, are a part of this space of flows connecting different nodes of different networks. He 
further stresses that the occupation of public space has the important feature of allowing the 
movement “to exist in its diverse reality” (Castells, 2012: 59-60). This occupation of space in 
combination with continuous broadcasting hereof played an important role of protecting the 
protesters (Ibid.). 
 
Summary 
Aouragh very pointedly recognizes networking spaces as not only meeting points but also 
sources of information and repetition to create agitation to motivate and mobilize. Where 
Castells puts a name to the merging of urban- and cyberspace as space of flows to designate 
how state control of flows can be circumvented. Furthermore the social media platforms helps 
triggering and maintaining hope and outrage through allowing autonomous flows to connect 
and unite the protester.       
 
                                                          
28 The ‘Friday of Resilience’ 
February 4th yet again a million people protested on a packed Tahrir Square. At this point a clear labour division 
was established on the square, resembling a small community, and several emergency clinics took care of the 
wounded. Despite the attacks from the regime supporters more people entered the square (Rashed, 2011: 26). 
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Global networks  
Through an analysis of the interplay between social media and mainstream media, nationally 
and internationally, this section shed light on the role of global networks in the Arab Spring. 
ICTs enabled the protesters to inform the world about what happened on the ground and thus 
challenged and the alliance between e.g. Mubarak and the US (Ritter el al., 2011). Lynch 
illuminates that changing important alliances or regional divisions is difficult and problematic 
but the role of new media in the protests in Egypt may be the most evident example to date 
that it actually did caused a change (Lynch, 2011: 306).  
 
International awareness and alliances  
Addressing a similar question as posed in the section on collective action about the 
mechanisms that previously supported years of autocracy in the Middle East, Yassin points 
towards securitization29 as an important factor. Domestically the Egyptian regime maintained 
a constant state of emergency that legitimized repression and unjust laws. Internationally 
Mubarak legitimized dictatorship by securitizing the perception that democratic reforms 
would bring terrorists and Islamists to power which would jeopardize the relationship with 
Israel and destabilize the region. Thus, stability and peace were granted greater importance to 
the world than democratic development. According to Yassin Al Jazeera and the emergence of 
digital media played a decisive role: “new media sources was an important part of the de-
securitization process” (Yassin, 2011).  
 
Cottle likewise argues that when the uprisings were at their peak new social media and 
mainstream media appeared to perform in tandem (2011: 652). In other words, the ICTs 
acted as a watchdog of state controlled national media, alerting international media of 
growing opposition and mediating step-by-step stories and images of distant events. 
International news, including Al Jazeera, “have distributed the flood of disturbing scenes and 
reports of the uprisings now easily accessed via Google’s YouTube and boomeranged them back 
into the countries concerned” (Cottle, 2011: 652). Hence mainstream media has effectively 
acted as a portal of live-streaming of images direct from the protests themselves through a 
flow of interdependent communication.  
                                                          
29 The concept is associated with the Copenhagen School (CoS) and the thought is to underscore the constructed 
nature of political categories and positions (Aradau, 2004:389).   
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It is worth noticing that Western mainstream media lost their interest in reporting daily from 
Egypt once Mubarak was removed from power whereas Al Jazeera continuously reported 
about the protesters to the Arab public opinion (Castells, 2012: 60). By transmitting live from 
the public place about the developments, mainstream media created a form of security for the 
movements. Castells stresses that ICT presents a new potential for counter-power because of 
the way it connects local activism to global networks. As he states: “Repression cannot be 
sustained against a massive movement supported by communication networks under global 
media attention unless the government is fully unified and operate in cooperation with 
influential foreign powers” (Castells, 2012: 61). The Egypt government did not fulfill these 
criteria. Government actions against the mobilizations were categorized as violent and 
suppressant, switching off Internet access and phone networks. The violence committed in 
this period was reported through the former mentioned mobile cameras that were 
disseminated via newly established channels (cf. ICT as a space and tool).   
 
What Cottle hints at by using the term watchdog (grassroots level actors) and what Castells 
phrases as repression (state level actors) is more clearly expressed by Ritter et al. when they 
present what they call the Iron Cage of Liberalism (ICL) to explain the significance of ICTs as a 
tool for creating global awareness.  The notion of ICL suggests that in cases where an 
oppressive regime is allied with democratic states and thereby economically dependent on 
international recognition, nonviolent protests can trap dictators in a situation where they 
either loose legitimacy or give up some power, in this case to the protesters. The reason for 
this is the normative human rights regime laid upon the international society;  “nonviolent 
protest is in itself little more than the expression of some of the most fundamental human and 
civil rights – the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly” (Ritter et al. 2011: 4). 
Ritter et al. argue that different protesters throughout history have succeeded in exposing the 
discrepancy between a regime’s insincere promises of democratic values and its actual 
performance thereby creating great difficulties for governments to oppress peaceful 
uprisings. This mechanism partly comes into play because the liberal governments of the 
West are dependent on legitimacy in their own country as well as international recognition.  
The implications of ICL functions through what Castells refers to as the geopolitical network.  
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When Mubarak succeeded Sadat30 he added to his geopolitical network by connecting to the 
United State which “was a fundamental source of stability for the dictatorship both in terms of 
fake democratic credentials, and in its ability to withstand economic difficulties and domestic 
challenges” (Castells, 2012: 80). In Egypt key networks were the military, state networks, 
economic networks, religious networks etc. (Castells, 2012: 79-80). An important switcher 
was Tahrir Square (Castells, 2012:81). The military authority was always the key network of 
power in Egypt and it remained autonomous at the same time as it held decisive power in the 
state; “Mubarak was the chief of the prestigious Air Force, and as such he became the switcher 
between the state and the armed forces, and took control of the bureaucracy and of the NDP, the 
official party” (Castells, 2012: 79). During the uprisings in 2011 when the political networks of 
the state lost capacity to influence people through domination, fear and violence, the 
geopolitical networks, primarily the United States, switched their connection from Mubarak’s 
network to strengthen the connection with the military network (Castells, 2012: 82).  
 
According to Ritter et al. the presence of ICL is why the Egyptian revolution was much more 
successful than e.g. the Iranian uprisings in 2009 (Ritter et al., 2011: 22). Where the process 
and use of ICTs in Iran were similar to the process of revolution in Egypt the different 
outcome was influenced by Egypt having a closer relationship with the West (Ibid.).  Ritter et 
al. concludes that “ICTs affect the process of nonviolent revolution, but their impact on the 
outcome is conditional on the ICL” (Ritter et al., 2011: 23). The following model31 illustrates the 
dynamic of ICTs, domestic mobilization, global awareness and ICL in non-violent revolutions.  
 
 
                                                          
30 In October 1981 
31 Ritter et al. 2011 
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Howard categorizes this phase of digital media and the Arab Spring as the international buy-in 
(Howard et al., 2011: 42), during which locally produced digital-media documentation drew 
in overseas news agencies, foreign governments and global diaspora in order to push matters 
towards a climax (Ibid.). Outcomes have been different due to the conditions. Either 
protester’s got off the street because they began to crumble before the concession and 
repression of the regime or civil war broke out as seen in Syria (Ibid.). But in the case of Egypt 
demonstrators kept standing on the street “to shape the future course of events by gaining 
control over the revolutionary narrative” (Ibid.). 
Thus it becomes evident how global conditions can have a great effect on the outcome of non-
violent revolutions.  
 
Global network society and legitimacy 
According to Khamis et al. another rather momentous factor was that “new media not only 
energized political activism inside Egypt, they also created a ‘virtual global public sphere’, where 
acts of political resistance could be proliferated and supported internationally” (Khamis et al., 
2011: 24). The empowered activists shared and associated ideas globally with others through 
social media, enabling a global collaboration between activists in Egypt and Tunisia as well as 
between protesters in the diaspora mobilizing on behalf of Cairo citizens (internet activists) 
(Ibid.).   
 
As pointed out above the Egyptian government tried to control the flow of communication 
inside and outside the country. However, the online communication flows are hard to control 
because they originate from the vigilance of the global Internet community, which includes 
hackers, companies, defenders of civil liberties, Anonymous (activist network), “and people 
from around the world for whom the Internet has become a fundamental right and a way of life” 
(Castells, 2012: 62) . These groups within the Internet community supported the Egyptian 
movement during cut-out (attest to the multimodal function) and were a big part of creating 
alliances (networked power) and thus enabling dissemination of knowledge and awareness 
(Castells, 2012: 64-65). An example could be; as Twitter was blocked in Egypt, Twitter created 
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a new account @twitterglobalpr32 dedicated to the speak-to-tweet in Egypt where protesters 
could call a number and turn a spoken message into a tweet.  
When the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) tried to control the revolution with 
even harsher means and repression than the Mubarak regime (Castells, 2012: 76), the 
protesters unified33. The action of Supreme Council basically granted the state full control and 
the Armed Forces limitless autonomy (Ibid.). However on November 1934, a massive protest 
went down in Tahrir and the “media and the Internet came to the rescue and thousands rushed 
to defend the liberated public space” (Castells, 2012: 77). Thus, clearly the protesters’ 
persistent commitment was strong and the media supported this commitment. The protesters 
had begun to vision an outcome that was capable of ushering into a democracy (Castells, 
2012: 78). A clear picture of Mubarak as illegitimate is the result of the protesters continuing 
their display of discontent through the new communication channels of social media and 
satellite broadcasters. 
The success of the networked structure in the Egyptian revolution, and the effective role of 
ICTs may influence censorship for other states in the Arab region and throughout the world 
(Khamis et al., 2011: 27). Today the actions of an authoritarian state are hindered in violently 
dominant actions because images of such will be broadcasted by their citizens “it could be said 
that the ability of these new forms of communication to expose the wrongdoings of the ruling 
regimes and to demonstrate their brutality has led to a new era of accountability and 
responsibility on the part of these governments that did not exist before this information 
revolution” (Khamis et al., 2011: 28).  Thus, as Castells stresses the monopoly of violence is 
enough for holding power but it is not sufficient (on a long term scale) as it requires the 
construction of legitimacy or resignation and acceptance in people’s minds (Castells, 2012: 
78). An acceptance no longer present amongst the citizenry of Egypt.  
 
                                                          
32 A profile on Twitter which is the public-facing news and statistics updating service.  
http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/twittercomms-twitterglobalpr_b13930  
33 February 13th 2011: SCAF dissolves the parliament and suspends the Constitution while also reassuring the 
Egyptian civil society that they would only hold power for six months or until elections are held.  
April 1st 2011: Thousands protest in “Save the Revolution” day, calling on SCAF for the quicker removal of old 
regime figures from political positions.  
May 27th 2011: Nationwide protests organized at the “Second Day of Rage” which was the largest since the 
downfall of Mubarak.  
July 1st 2011: Nationwide protests (Suez, Alexandria and Cairo) in the “Friday of Retribution” voice disapproval 
of SCAF’s slow pace of change five months after the revolution.  
34 November 19th 2011: Protesters re-occupy Tahrir Square and SCAF uses tear gas on protesters. 
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Summary 
The exemplification of Tunisia and Egypt has revealed that a combination of various 
conditions and actions intersecting played an important role in the downfall of Ben Ali and 
later Mubarak. For example pre-existing interplay of communication technologies created 
mobile networks to reach yet further; to international journalists and diaspora Egyptians who 
then used internet networking spaces as sources of information as did international 
mainstream media. These networking spaces were possible because of support networks such 
as Twitter, Google and Anonymous. Moreover, mechanisms such as ICL and de-securitization 
helped delegitimize the Egyptian regime on the international scene thereby increasing 
political pressure not to mention the US drawing support from Mubarak. 
 
Conclusive remarks on the analysis 
Before moving on to the discussion of conflict transformation we will conclude on the central 
points from the articles on the Arab Spring that could be of influence in conflict 
transformation.  
 
Firstly, ICT has turned out to be a substantial factor with regards to collective action making it 
easier, safer, and faster through the possibility of mobilizing online. Moreover the individual is 
made aware of other like-minded people sharing their opinion again enabling them to 
mobilize. Thus, ICTs can function as a challenge to pluralistic ignorance and make people 
realize each other and the force of unifying behind a common cause and at the same time 
spread outrage and hope throughout a whole region.  
 
Secondly, ICTs has been a factor in transforming the public space thereby affecting the flow of 
communication and the potential to generate legitimacy. In the Arab Spring the interaction 
between online and offline spaces played a crucial role in creating togetherness, organising 
the broadcasting of the efforts and consolidating the political analysis of the regime and the 
need for change. This multimodal interaction of networking spaces allowed autonomous 
communication flows to reach a global audience and created a picture of legitimate people 
power.  
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Thirdly, powerful global networks and mainstream media switched and connected with 
activists through networking spaces which in the Egyptian case lead to the downfall of 
Mubarak. Thus, alongside with global networks of activists, international alliances likewise 
turned out to be a significant factor in the outcome of the events. Mechanism such as ICL 
turned the loss of domestic legitimacy for Mubarak into international pressure helped by 
information from the ground distributed through ICTs.  
 
Thus, addressing the first part of the research question about how counter-power exercised 
through ICTs can generate legitimacy, it can be concluded that ICT functions as a tool and 
space for counter-power through facilitating collective action, transforming the public space 
and connecting activists with global networks which can help sustain long term commitment. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Conflict transformation and ICTs 
Taking point of departure in the concepts explored in the analysis of ICTs the project now 
opens up a discussion about how this relates to the transformation of international conflicts. 
The different dynamics of how ICTs can improve collective action, the public space and global 
networks will inform and elevate how to address cultural violence, improve nonviolent action 
and create new positions.  
Overall, ICTs in the Arab Spring helped civil actors to: 
1) generate legitimacy through mobilizing and connecting oppositional voices and gaining 
global support for the movements. 
2) challenge the legitimacy of the rulers through creating global awareness about the violence 
committed by the state and through long term transformation of the public sphere. 
The two dimensions are inherently interconnected but at the same time present different 
aspects of how ICTs both can be used to delegitimize the state and support the position of the 
people as legitimate. In transformation of asymmetric conflicts these two dimensions 
corresponds with empowering35 the weaker part and challenging cultural violence. 
 
This chapter explores the potential use of ICTs for generating and challenging legitimacy in 
international conflicts using the conflict in Israel-Palestine as a recurring example. First of all, 
nonviolence and cultural violence will be outlined and problematized. This leads to a 
discussion of nonviolent action and the contradictions between mass mobilization and 
essential principles of conflict transformation followed by an examination of global awareness 
as a dimension of legitimacy.  Subsequently, follows a discussion of discursive transformation, 
hereunder de-securitization and pluralistic ignorance. Finally, the potential of citizen 
journalism will be addressed and problematized.  
Nonviolence and cultural violence in Israel-Palestine 
Throughout the 64 years that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has taken place there has been 
numerous attempts at bottom-up peace building in form of school projects (Bar-On et al., 
2006), dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians (unesco.org), sport projects (peace-
                                                          
35 By empowering we mean strengthening the possibility for the weaker part to claim and influence legitimacy. 
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sport.org) and a peace village project (nswas.org). However these so-called people-to-people 
projects have been criticized for not taking into account the asymmetric power structures of 
the conflict and thus focus too much on recognizing each other as human beings instead of 
addressing the unequal structures that nurture the conflict. In this way the projects have little 
effect or at worst help normalize and maintain status quo (ICCP, 2006: 5). Rather than solely 
working horizontally between the people, it is suggested that; “attention needs to shift to 
working in each society separately in order to enhance the capability for organised collective 
action, especially on the Palestinian side, and to transform ideology, especially on the Israeli 
side” (ICCP, 2006: 3). This corresponds with Lederach’s focus on the interdependence gap but 
implies more than just strengthening the vertical relations; namely empowering the 
Palestinians and challenging the discourses of violence in Israel. Since “negotiation is only 
possible when the needs and interests of all those involved and affected by the conflict are 
legitimated and articulated” (Lederach, 1995: 14) nonviolence is necessary to strengthen the 
position of the weaker part. In theory legitimacy can be obtained through nonviolent 
collective action where the nonviolent forces in society stand together against structural and 
direct violence (Dudouet, 2011). Likewise, the balance of legitimacy can be influenced by 
challenging the cultural norms and discourses that legitimize the violence (Reich, 2003).  
 
Cultural violence 
Cultural violence concerns the same kind of power as Castells describes with his concept of 
communication power which is the shaping of minds. Cultural violence makes reality opaque 
by making “direct and structural violence look, even feel right – or at least not wrong (…) and 
thus rendered acceptable in society” (Galtung, 1999: 196-197).  
The question is how comprehensive and ingrained the cultural violence is in society? If it 
defines how we think or even account for what we do not think then how can it ever be 
challenged? When speaking of violence Galtung makes the following indexation: “direct 
violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and downs; cultural violence is an 
invariant, a ‘permanent’” (Galtung, 1996: 199).  Thus, culture can be understood as something 
basic that only transforms slowly and it remains unclear what could be the source of cultural 
change in this terminology. When describing the dialectics between the three levels of 
violence Galtung states that there often is “a causal flow from cultural via structural to direct 
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violence [that] can be identified” (Galtung, 1996: 200). This can also be related to his 
description of cultural violence in Israel-Palestine (Galtung, 1990: 297). Here he looks at the 
discourse of being Gods chosen people as the basis for legitimization and generation of Israeli 
violence. He states that this chosenness36 translates into eight types of structural and direct37 
violence from the act of killing to exploitation. According to Galtung the logic of being chosen 
entails an opposition towards the unchosen, which is equated as Self and Other. It is the 
gradient of value going from exalted (Self) to debased (Other) that legitimize structural 
violence. This will often become a self-fulfilling prophecy resulting in ‘the others’ becoming 
debased because of exploitation and moreover exploited because they are dehumanized. Thus 
conflicting identities and escalating ‘othering’ is at the root of the conflict.  
Galtung further states that “changing the cultural genetic code looks at least as difficult as 
changing the biological genetic code” and he suggests that cultural engineering might be just 
as problematic as biological engineering (Galtung, 1990: 301). Though this perspective might 
have great explanatory potential as to understand why a conflict is frozen because of equally 
exclusive positions and categories it makes it very hard to imagine how such cultural violence 
could change. Galtung does not come with a solution to this problem but refers to the 
Gandhian principles of unity-of-life and unity-of-means-and-ends which imply a nonviolent 
approach.  
Castells seems to agree with the argument that cultural identity is at the root of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. He stresses that there is a historic escalation where religious, ethnic, 
territorial and historical identity make any negotiation based on non-identity principles 
impossible. Because of a history of persecution, Jews survival is linked with the existence of 
land-based state that is constructed around their identity (Castells, 2010: xx). Castells 
concludes that coexistence depends on coexisting identities but gives no suggestions as to 
how this could be cultivated (Castells, 2010: xx). However, Castells’ theory on counter-power, 
mobilization and communication networks appears to be very relevant in terms of nonviolent 
                                                          
36 Adjective deductive from Gods chosen people, refers to Zionism and the idea that the Jewish people is selected 
by God to make his kingdom on earth that is Israel (1990).  
37 “killing; maiming, material deprivation by denying West Bank inhabitants what is needed for livelihood; there is 
desocialization within the theocratic state of Israel with second class citizenship to non-Jews; there is detention, 
individual expulsion and perennial threat of massive expulsion” (Galtung, 1990:297) 
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mobilization and challenging the legitimization of violence and thus how the Ghandian 
principle of unity-of-means-and-ends can be supported by ICTs. 
Nonviolence  
In conflict transformation collective action corresponds with the strategy of nonviolent action 
e.g. in the form of vast demonstrations, mass hunger strike or civil disobedience. Galtung 
argues that it is important to supplement negative nonviolent action with positive nonviolent 
initiatives for dialogue. Concerning the process of the Arab Spring Galtung e.g. criticizes the 
protesters for not attempting to understand the other side through dialogue: “When dialogue 
offers are rejected by the opposition demanding regime change, there is poor conflict analysis at 
work” (Galtung, 2011). Moreover positive nonviolence adds the dimension of creating a 
shared vision beyond “down with Mubarak”38 or “down with Israel”39. If the use of ICTs in the 
Arab Spring is to be of inspiration for conflict transformation it will be decisive to add a 
dimension of positive nonviolence.  
The practice of nonviolent action is not new in the Palestinian struggle, in fact there has been 
a long history of nonviolence since 1948 (Munayyer, 2012). However, none of these action 
have been particularly successful which can be explained with different hypotheses; 1) that 
the nonviolence has been accompanied or overruled by violent action e.g. exercised by Hamas, 
2) that the West and the media has paid little or no attention to these struggles and 3) that the 
nonviolent mobilization has been decentralized and unorganized partly complicated by the 
checkpoints, the wall and separation of Gaza and the West Bank (Munayyer, 2012), (White, 
2012). The two last-mentioned obstacles could potentially be overcome by the use of ICTs 
because these tools make it easier, cheaper and less risky to arrange collective action across 
the West Bank-Gaza division. Moreover, ICT makes it possible to reach the global community 
by bypassing the Israeli censorship which we will explore in the section on global awareness 
(Sobrino, 2010). The following discuss the potential of ICTs in nonviolent action. 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 It can be argued that a shared vision in the Egyptian uprisings would have been beneficial for the further 
political process. Currently several protests against Morsi at Tahrir Square indicates great divisions in the society 
and satisfaction with yet another leader (BBC 2012) 
39 Phone-conversation with Galtung 
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Nonviolent action and ICTs 
Sobrino (2010) argues that the development of ICTs has had a great impact on the Palestinian 
situation. The Palestinian Territories may appear to be a difficult scenario to promote 
messages of peace and dialogue through media because of the duration of the conflict and the 
effects on civil- as well as media-society (Sobrino, 2010: 56). For decades the Palestinian 
people have suffered psychological damage and lack of coverage of basic needs and security: 
“However, it is precisely in these difficult environments where media and new media can 
reinforce a better coexistence and (…) act as catalysts for peace and dialogue” (Ibid.). The 
Palestinian people have become more involved and active in the conflict thanks to the 
increased use of effective ICT channels (Sobrino, 2010: 57).  
 
Along the same lines Munayyer points towards ICT as a potential game-changer in the conflict, 
boldly adding: “If ever there was a moment for Palestinians to overwhelmingly embrace 
nonviolence, that moment is now.” (Munayyer, 2012). Besides playing a role in reaching the 
global community ICTs have likewise inspired Palestinian hope and trust in nonviolence 
action because of the successful aftermath (downfall of dictators) seen in Egypt and Tunisia. 
Like Castells point out this transnational spread of hope is of great importance for collective 
action and trust in the ability to create change. It is moreover crucial to keep the resistance 
nonviolent because any form of direct violence delegitimizes the whole project (which 
remains an obstacle particularly due to the violent approach of Hamas). If the Palestinians 
could succeed in creating a united movement40 that refrained from violent actions and gained 
global attention to their perspectives this could change the perception of Palestine globally: “A 
mass nonviolent movement might tip the balance, especially if the world—including the Israeli 
public —began to see Palestinians as noble practitioners of passive resistance rather than as 
suicide bombers” (Klein 2011). The line of thought here is that if some of the nonviolent 
Palestinian movements could communicate their positions and claims to the world then 
maybe the asymmetrical equation between Palestine and Israel would change.  
Despite the enthusiasm for nonviolence inspired by the Arab Spring and the different 
nonviolent actions since 2011, none of these actions seemed to change the situation in Israel 
                                                          
40 The latest reconciliations between Hamas and Fatah can be seen as a step towards a more united force but the 
recent violent events in Gaza proves that violence remains an obstacle. 
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Palestine or let to any form of peace process. For example the Nakba41 day in 2011 was 
marked by hundreds of thousands pro-Palestinian Arabs storming the Israeli border. They 
coordinated through Facebook but the main-page with 3.5 million supporters was closed 
down by Facebook because people started to post violent videos (CNN, 2011). Besides the 
Israeli response of gunfire killing 12 and injuring more the protests were primarily nonviolent 
with the exception of some protesters throwing stones. However, the protesters did not 
succeed in maintaining the momentum or creating a narrative beyond the usual tensions in 
the region (Al Jazeera, 2011). Despite the new arena of space of flows one could argue that a 
lack of a shared physical space due to the separation of people by borders and checkpoints 
remains an obstacle for Palestinian collective action. 
Following the argument of positive nonviolence, one thing that could support future protest 
would be a shared vision beyond their rage against Zionism. This could e.g. include ideas 
about a one or two state solution or the future relationship between Israelis and Arabs. Such 
vision might not only be of significance in terms of challenging enemy images, it might also be 
of great news value because an entirely nonviolent mass-demonstration presenting a greater 
vision would be breaking news in the Middle-East-context compared to the newsworthiness 
of the use of ICTs in the Arab Spring. Moreover, the communication of Palestinians reaching 
out to Israelis and vice versa being disseminated broadly on social media and satellite 
television could create pressure on Hamas and governmental networks in Israel to re-position 
themselves. 
On the other hand a vision of this kind might be way too much of a demand for a popular 
uprising because people likely disagree on many crucial points. It is easier to mobilize for a 
simple cause with a clear enemy image than for a complex vision. This anticipates potential 
contradictions between ideals of conflict transformation and the practice of nonviolent 
(online) mobilization which will be discussed in the following.  
 
 
 
                                                          
41 What can also be referred to as “Day of the Catastrophe”; the annual day of commemoration, marking the 
displacement of the Palestinian people that accompanied the creation of Israel in 1948 (BBC News) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18073381.  
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Embracing complexity vs. mobilizing masses 
Many principles of conflict transformation such as the potential for participation and the 
emphasis on bottom-up approaches correspond with the possibilities emerging within digital 
communication. At the same time, the essential dimensions of conflict transformation such as 
long-term commitment and embracing complexity may be contradicting with the use of ICTs. 
In this section some of the challenges related to applying ITCs in conflict transformation will 
be addressed. 
First of all, the question is whether mass mobilization even is a suitable strategy for conflict 
transformation. Here Lederach’s thoughts on change can be of value. While many peace 
workers focus on the amount of people participating in a demonstration creating a critical 
mass for a cause, Lederach points towards the significance of small groups of individuals in 
the process of change. ICTs have added to this focus on measuring social change in numbers 
and media awareness. From Lederach’s experiences conflict transformation is a complex 
process that needs long term commitment and includes transformation of deep structures. 
Mass mobilization might create great moments and awareness for a few days whereas 
consistent, sustainable change needs a smaller group of people committing themselves to the 
cause (Lederach, 2005: 88). 
One could argue that Lederach here misses the role of media in creating new conditions for 
sociopolitical change through strategic communication of new legitimate claims and positions. 
His point however emphasizes the importance of also nurturing change in smaller groups to 
uphold the consistency and long-term commitment needed for sustainable change beyond 
great moments. Moreover, it points towards some contradictions between conflict 
transformation, mass mobilization and networked structure. 
It could be said that the whole principle of having a comprehensive vision in many ways 
contradicts the very structure of the new networked movements. While previous front figures 
such as Mahatma Gandhi or Martin Luther King were able to put forward a vision that people 
could subscribe to the networked form does not permit this kind of hierarchical goal-
orientation as it is leaderless and diverse by its very nature. Although a comprehensive vision 
might be too much to ask for in nonviolent action it would certainly strengthen the Palestinian 
nonviolent cause with more coherence and togetherness as the current mobilization is 
characterized by being “decentralized and disparate” (White, 2012). More cohesion and unity 
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in the Palestinian nonviolent struggle corresponds perfectly with the potential of the 
networked movement. As Castells argues “people can only challenge domination by connecting 
with each other, by sharing outrage, by feeling togetherness and by constructing alternative 
projects for themselves and for society at large” (Castells, 2012: 229). Again ICTs can be 
considered a suitable tool to enhance communication and constitute togetherness.  
However, the question remains whether ICT is suited for creating shared visions that 
encompass pre-existing networks of power, e.g. Galtung’s claim that the mass mobilization of 
Egyptians lack positive nonviolence. As Lynch argues “there is a deep tension between protest 
mobilization and political organization. The leaderless, network structures which can hold 
together a disparate coalition of millions of protestors around a single, simple demand—
“Mubarak must go”—are typically far less effective at articulating specific, nuanced demands in 
the negotiation process which follows success.” (Lynch, 2011: 305). Thus the ideal of having a 
shared vision beyond toppling a dictator or protesting for the right to return might contradict 
the very conditions for mass mobilization. First of all, a comprehensive vision in the Israeli- 
Palestinian case is not only highly contentious and complicated but includes numerous of 
issues, technicalities and clashing interests that would make the vision very complex and 
difficult to gather people around. Secondly, one could argue that the Arab world in general is 
too divided that any attempt to create a shared vision would threaten the possibility for 
collective action. Had the Egyptians worked towards creating a shared vision before initiating 
the revolution they might never had gone beyond the first discussions of secularism vs. Islam. 
In this way mass mobilization appears possible mainly when fundamental differences are 
transcended for the sake of a higher, but relatively simple cause.   
Does this mean that mass mobilization presupposes a simplification of causes in the form of 
enemy images and personification of the evil? Not necessarily. Embracing a culture of peace 
does not imply having everybody agreeing on a greater vision. The challenge is more so to 
focus on the violent structures as the problem rather than a single person or group of people. 
Particularly in conflict situations it is difficult but necessary to refrain from reproducing 
enemy images. Although us-them categories might mobilize a lot of people they most likely 
activate more fear and enemy images which are counterproductive in conflict transformation. 
Thus, an emphasis should be made on a positive nonviolent approach in terms of being open 
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for dialogue and mobilizing against structures rather than necessarily creating a 
comprehensive vision.  
Global awareness  
As concluded from the research done on the uprisings in Egypt international relations, global 
networks and the media attention formed a strong sentiment to overthrow Mubarak after a 
severe static pressure from the Egyptian people. The question is to what extent similar 
mechanisms could play a role in the transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Munayyer confidently states that Western governments need to speak up about Israeli 
violence because: “By condemning Palestinian violent resistance while failing to condemn 
Israel’s repression of nonviolent resistance, Israel’s allies – above all the United States – are 
sending the dangerous message to young Palestinians that no resistance to Israeli occupation is 
ever acceptable” (Munayyer, 2012). 
The lack of American pressure on Israel with regards to international law and human rights 
challenges the ideas of how ICL42 is supposed to function in international relations. 
It can be argued that the mechanisms of ICL depends on the relation between the states 
involved since human rights violations committed by Israel continue even though or maybe 
by virtue of their alliance with the US. What seemed to condemn Mubarak to loose legitimacy 
does not seem to form the same distance and actions of the US. Even though the US officially 
calls on Israel to reconsider the newest plans from the Israeli government to expand with 
3000 more settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank43 they are not taking any direct 
actions beyond lip service44.   
 
Despite the strong Israeli-American alliance one could argue that ICL potentially could enter 
into force if the Palestinians mobilized consistently and nonviolently using ICTs to connect 
with global networks and hereby put further pressure on the US and Israel globally.  
  
Global awareness and ICTs 
Several authors emphasize the potential of ICTs when it comes to documenting violence for a 
global audience thereby challenging the legitimacy of the Israeli occupation (Kevorkian, 
                                                          
42 Iron Cage of Liberalism (cf. International awareness and alliances) 
43 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20585706  
44 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm 
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2012), (Ghaith, 2010), (Lunat, 2009). Ghaith e.g. stresses that “the Internet has played a major 
role in showing Palestinian suffering to the World” (Ghaith, 2010: 64) because Palestinian 
bloggers, citizen-journalists and websites distribute information about i.a. human rights 
violations. One example of this occurred when a YouTube video of an Israeli soldier abusing 
Palestinian civilians were published which, according to Ghaith, forced Israel to send the 
soldier to trial (Ibid.).  
 
During the fighting in 2008 Israel forbid foreign journalists to enter Gaza and a grand cyber 
campaign was launched to provide citizen journalism and thus inform the world about the 
situation (Sobrino, 2012: 57).  This form of many-to-many communication enables people to 
share information about their grievances and create togetherness that cultivates collective 
action across borders. An outrage against the wall of silence, injustice and indifference is e.g. 
expressed in the Gaza Youth’s Manifesto for Change: “we (…) will not rest until the truth about 
Gaza is known by everybody in this whole world and in such a degree that no more silent consent 
or loud indifference will be accepted” (GYBO, 2011).   The Gaza Youth Breaks Out mobilization 
furthermore requested their followers and other interested to support their actions by 
promoting and sharing their manifesto on one’s Facebook-profile (GOBY, 2011) and in this 
manner reached out to the global community. 
 
Likewise transnational activists such as Avaaz45 and Anonymous46 have interfered in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since 2007 Avaaz has launched several online petitions in support 
of Palestinian statehood (Avaaz.org). Motivated by the recent fighting in Gaza and Israel 
Anonymous declared a nonviolent war (Operation Israel) on Israeli cyberspace in reaction to 
the human rights violations. They managed to do 44 million hacking attempts on Israeli 
government official websites after Israel began air strikes in the Gaza (Schwarz, 2012). The 
outcome of global activist networks has been vividly expressed in Egypt with the downfall of 
Mubarak but has yet to prove effect full in the case of Israel-Palestine.     
 
Despite the different attempts to address the global community through ICTs there has not 
been success in putting enough pressure on Israel, e.g. in relation to the newest settlements. 
                                                          
45 Avaaz is an online community with more than 17 million members (Avaaz.org). 
46 A loosely associated hacktivist group   
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This is of course connected to the violence committed by Hamas that seems to delegitimize 
the Palestinian case but might also be linked to the media discourses about the conflict 
limiting what stories that can be told about the conflict which will be further explored in the 
following. 
 
Discursive transformation  
Being a catalyst for much societal communication, media can both be seen as an instrument 
for cultural violence and thereby the legitimization of direct and structural violence as well as 
a tool and space for challenging this (Bratic, 2004: 10). Media often become crucial 
instruments of opinion-making in society being the main source of information concerning 
the ‘other’ side (Hass, 2012: 77).  
 
According to Reich the media can be understood as both forming and formed by society: “On 
the one hand, journalists have to fit their story into the given patterns of meaning of the existing 
discourse. On the other hand, it is actually the media themselves which produce these patterns of 
meaning prevailing in society” (Reich, 2003: 6).  In continuation hereof she highlights 
asymmetrical power relations in the media sphere as a great obstacle for constructive conflict 
management if not taken into consideration (Reich, 2003: 16). Within the field of media and 
conflict it is crucial to be sensitive towards acts of domination and oppression. Often media 
coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not reflect the social construction of both 
discourses in an equal way47 (Reich, 2003: 17). This is the reality of both international main 
stream media coverage and local media. The media coverage of suicide attacks or direct 
physical violence, does not recognize “the insecurity deriving from a deeper-rooted structural 
violence of occupation, prevalent long before the current acute escalation of violence” (Ibid.). 
Under these circumstances the media shape the audience’s view of the ‘others’ and their 
perception of the conflict (Hass, 2010: 81). The asymmetries of the discourses are already 
embedded when selecting certain places to show where events occur (Ibid.). An example 
could be when the conflict is situated at demonstrations, bombings or suicide attacks. 
Palestinians would perhaps rather situate it in their daily checkpoint encounters or in front of 
their demolished houses. The more violent a conflict becomes the more likely the media is to 
focus on ones party’s victimization and blame the ‘others’ for the harm done to them (Hass, 
                                                          
47 Which may as well be a general observation in many conflict situations 
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2010: 82). The media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems to follow a pattern 
when covering events incomprehensible to an international audience as it is presented within 
already established discursive frames of violence. 
 
One example is the ‘Day of Anger’48 which was a campaign addressing the international 
community, aiming at an international recognition of the vast impact the continuous 
settlement activities have on the daily lives of ordinary Palestinians (Reich, 2003: 18). In the 
international media, however, the event was portrayed “according to the discursive 
regularities that depicted [the] Palestinian demonstrations on the ‘Day of Anger’ as violent and 
destructive” (Ibid.). Thus, the Palestinian hope for global awareness about the settlement 
activities was not in accordance with the international discourse. Instead utterances such as 
‘no peace with settlements!’ were internationally seen as aggressive slogans rather than 
words of self-empowerment; “tragically, they stand in complete contradiction to the actual 
power relations in the region, leading the international community and worldwide media 
audience to see the words, not the actual daily deeds” (Reich, 2003: 19). 
In relation to the ruling power relations Castells utters that a political message is a media 
message which entails that the politically related message conveyed through the media, must 
be expressed within the language of media (Castells, 2007: 241). In the case of the ‘Day of 
Anger’ there was an interaction between the local and the global discourse but the same 
‘discursive fragment’ formed different statements in the international discourse than 
intended within the local discourse (Reich, 2003: 28).  
 
By discursive conflict transformation Reich refers to media intervention in asymmetrical 
conflicts: “discourse analysis to media work in asymmetrical conflicts implies creating a less 
vulnerable and diverse discursive formation of the weaker party, enabling greater flexibility in 
shifting from positions to interests” (Reich, 2003: 37). If journalists want to unravel the 
meaning of the people affected they have to relate to the local discourse to understand it. This 
is significant because the power-sensitive selection of events and arguments has the force to 
disrupt hierarchies, solely by allowing the powerless to get their voice herd (Reich, 2003: 28-
                                                          
48 In 1999 several demonstrations and protest actions took place in the West Bank in response to the steadily 
increasing Israeli settlement activities. On May 4th 1999 the Palestinian Authority declared the ‘Day of Anger’ in 
seven Palestinian-controlled cities and in Jerusalem (Reich, 2003: 12). 
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29). What Reich perceives as ‘discursive transformation’, the alterations of mindsets and 
structure, could thus be an important step towards transforming cultural violence. 
 
Part of such transformation would imply challenging securitization – the discursive trait of 
danger, emergency, threat and the concomitant Israeli-Palestinian identity construction. 
According to Hass the Israeli media contribute to the securitization of the conflict. Although 
freedom of speech allegedly prevails Hass stresses that when security and foreign policy are 
involved, media adhere to the official government language and depend on information from 
the armed forces (Hass, 2010: 80-81).  Thus, the Israeli media “does not contribute to a de-
escalation and de-securitization of the conflict and therefore cannot live up to the ideal of being 
a ‘watch-dog’” (Hass, 2010: 87). The question is whether new media could play a role in 
challenging the Israeli security discourse, which will be the topic in the following section. 
 
De-securitization 
The notion of de-securitization has so far been insufficiently theorized (Aradau, 2004), 
(Coskun, 2008). According to Santos the concept of de-securitization represents “the main 
media action impact area” (2010: 1). Despite the focus on post-conflict societies Santos’ theory 
of peace media as a tool for de-securitization (Santos, 2010) can be relevant when looking at 
ICTs and cultural violence.  Media can affect de-securitization at two levels; 1) through a 
deconstructive-constructive process to educate the public about the other side beyond being a 
“security problem” and 2) through a counter-securitization logic serving as an antidote to the 
security discourses (Santos, 2010: 7).   
 
It is important to consider the content of the counter-discourse. If the discourse is merely 
focused on “security to the Palestinians as well” it would maintain the self/other dichotomy of 
Israel and Palestine as fundamentally opposed (Aradau, 2004: 399). Aradau states that the 
challenge is to suspend exclusionary logic while maintaining the possibility to discriminate 
and fight e.g. securitization. 
Aradau’s argument is that de-securitization should consider: 1) the political implications of 
security politics that hinders debate because exceptional measures legitimize rushing through 
procedures and 2) the intertwinement of security, authority and privilege (Aradau, 2004: 
396). Her solution on how to de-securitize seems to be in line with the paradigm of cultural 
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peace as it underscores the essentiality of universal principles and rights: “Dangerous others 
are not legitimate discussion partners and argumentative ethics simply does not consider them. 
What is first needed is a process of dis-identification, a rupture from the assigned identity and a 
partaking of a universal principle” (Aradau, 2004: 402).  
Tackling institutional authority by disseminating alternative knowledge and promoting dis-
identification (Aradau, 2004: 396) is dependent on big media networks. In the Arab Spring 
media networks such as Al Jazeera, CNN and BBC used blogs, Twitter and Facebook as valid 
sources of information thereby giving activists and participants the possibility to disseminate 
their perspectives and hereby influence public space and claim legitimate positions. This is 
not the case in Israel where it has been shown that employees at big media networks see 
participatory journalism as a necessary evil and as promoting low culture (Manosewitch, 
2011: 424, 427).  
 
As shown in the Egyptian case building a blog-sphere takes time. In Palestine there has been a 
growth in blogging and in Israel online journalism and user generated comments have 
likewise grown (Allan et al. 2007: 385-387), (Manosevitch, 2011: 425). Whilst Israeli media 
continue to be highly centralized and in support of security perspectives Israeli social 
movements have used Internet as networking spaces of political struggle (Sereno, 2010: 19-
20), (Manosevitch, 2011: 431). Blogs in Gaza remain quite free of Palestinian governmental 
control creating potential to create further connections to other media networks and/or 
global networks (Allan et al., 2007: 384).  
While conflict transformation cannot be reduced to a linguistic process and the power of 
media should not be seen in isolation from structural transformation ICT presents itself as a 
powerful tool for de-securitization (Santos, 2011: 9). As seen in the Arab Spring the 
transformation of the public sphere with new communication networks contributed to the 
process of de-securitization (Yassin, 2012) which could potentially also play a role in the 
transformation of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the following we will investigate whether the 
mechanism of challenging pluralistic ignorance likewise could be a game-changer in this 
respect.  
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Pluralistic ignorance as cultural violence 
Pluralistic ignorance can in many ways be seen as a form of cultural violence in which norms 
and social ideas promoted by dominating networks hide that a majority subscribes to the 
opposite perspective than the performed public opinion. Thus, a way to challenge the 
legitimization of violence is through revealing that the general population in fact disagrees 
with the violent approach of the government and create connection between the people 
critical towards the war.  
Tufekci likewise points towards the importance of challenging pluralistic ignorance in 
situations of war; “the strongest political act that a populace can do is to actively and publicly 
withdraw their consent and refuse to confer legitimacy on a particular regime—or, in this case, 
a war.  This is not to say that active withdrawing of consent guarantees to stop a war; but it 
certainly complicates efforts towards one” (Tufekci, 2012). Tufekci gives an example of the 
Israel-Loves-Iran movement where an Israeli man posted an update on Facebook declaring 
his love to the Iranian people stating that “we will never bomb your country” (Israel-Loves-
Iran, 2012). This message got thousands of likes from all over the world within a short period 
of time, hereunder from a lot of Iranians and Israelis. Tufekci’s argument is that this 
movement has the opportunity to reveal that many Israelis and Iranians actually do not want 
the war.  
In relation to securitization pluralistic ignorance would e.g. imply that it was mainly the 
governments of Israel and Palestine respectively that pushed forward a paradigm of security 
while the people in reality were less afraid of “the other”. However, due to the protracted, 
complex and deep-rooted state of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it is doubtful that this would 
be the case for the majority. This is for example seen in the fact that the Israel-loves-Palestine 
campaign (inspired by Israel-Loves-Iran) is liked by less than 1/10 of the original campaign 
(Israel-Loves-Palestine, 2012).  
Shamir et al. (1997) presents a study on pluralistic ignorance in Israel arguing that although 
information can challenge pluralistic ignorance of the relationship to the Palestinians it is not 
enough. Likewise, Castells stresses that “information per se does not alter attitudes unless there 
is an extraordinary level of cognitive dissonance. This is because people select information 
according to their cognitive frames” (Castells 2009: 169). While pluralistic ignorance played a 
role in Egypt this does not seem to be the case in neither Israel nor Palestine. The 
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comprehensiveness of the security discourse seems be the toughest opponent to a 
repositioning of Palestinians as threats and Israelis as suppressors. Internet spaces cannot 
challenge cultural violence via connecting likeminded if the discontent is not very general and 
the government actions are seen as e.g. necessary. The challenge is thus to disseminate new 
claims and positions to public space rather than revealing already existing opinions. Here new 
media can provide new potential in the form of citizen journalism.    
Citizen journalism 
New media play much the same role in conflicts and the transformation hereof as traditional 
media like newspapers and television. The new aspect is the added amount of reporters, 
lower publication costs and the increased ability of ordinary people to make self-
representations, reach target audience or broader public and hereby take part in the 
discursive construction and reproduction of violence or conversely the critique hereof. This 
e.g. implies reporting on different violent actions, raising awareness about the parts in the 
conflict or challenging public discourses and enemy images.  
 
Cultural violence corresponds with Castells theory of how media shapes people’s minds 
through what is said and what is being silenced. Castells emphasizes that “the main issue is not 
the shaping of the minds by explicit messages in the media, but the absence of a given content in 
the media. What does not exist in the media does not exist in the public mind, even if it could 
have a fragmented presence in individual minds” (Castells, 2007: 241). Thus perspectives or 
events that are omitted from media coverage imply entrenchment of already existing 
positions. In this way new media can play a significant role in giving voice to the otherwise 
silenced messages e.g. about violence at the checkpoints, agents for change or narratives 
about the Palestinian identity on the international media scene.   
Different scholars have analysed how some efforts are already taking place in Palestine to use 
new media and citizen journalism to challenge the silencing of the other and promote counter-
narratives to the general discourse (Allan et al., 2007), (Hamdy, 2010). The silenced other can 
refer to various contexts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Overall it is about representing 
what is omitted or perceived misrepresented e.g. Palestinian attempts to reach global 
audience and narrate their perspective focusing on everyday experience (Allan et al., 2007).  
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Following the optic on the importance of public space this could respectively create pressure 
on the Israeli government; domestically because of public display of Israeli representation 
against government actions, or through foreign relations as the world realizes that ‘the 
Palestinians are like us’ and deserve equal rights.  
Besides the virtual space being another war-zone (Hamdy, 2010) where extremist groups can 
distribute their propaganda it can be argued that “the new media environment has created 
space for peaceful Palestinian voices that would never have been heard in the past” (Munayyer, 
2012). Allan et al. elaborate how online citizen journalism can play the role of promoting 
human rights and transcend us-them dichotomies hereby constituting discursive spaces of 
engagement (Allan et al., 2007: 373). In Palestine several blogs, both in Arabic and English, 
communicate firsthand, testimonies and personal experience (Allan et al., 2007: 385-387). 
 
In this respect ICT presents itself as a suitable tool and space for addressing the 
interdependence gap through network-creation, information-sharing and thus “weaving 
relational webs across social spaces” (Lederach, 2005: 84).   Along the same lines Hattotuwa 
argues that ICT’s can create coherence and communication between track 1, 2 and 3 thereby 
supporting conflict transformation at different levels; 
“the defining characteristic of ICT in peacebuilding is that it enables information 
flows that not only radically subvert existing patterns of knowledge flows and 
power centres, but  in empowering organisations, groups and individuals to 
produce and share information (…)   helps bring a greater degree of cohesion, 
transparency and accountability to processes of conflict transformation that were 
hitherto unthinkable.” (Hattotuwa 2004: 44) 
 
In Palestine as well as in Israel this could e.g. create more transparency in the society and give 
a voice to the people who could challenge the violent discourse of Hamas or the Israeli 
government. In Israel the Internet e.g. helped networks work together and strengthen their 
position towards the building of the Gaza fence (Manosevitch, 2011: 431).  
Exploring the connection between so-called peace journalism and alternative citizen 
journalism Shaw et al. argue that both genres seek to address cultural and structural violence 
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giving voice to people on the ground and to the peace makers (Shaw et al., 2011: 48). As 
Castells expresses it; “communication networks are able to include and enclose cultural 
diversity and multiplicity of messages to a much greater extent than any other public space in 
history” (Castells 2009: 300). Moreover alternative media corresponds with peace journalism 
in its way of challenging the objectivity-paradigm of traditional media. There is however also 
important differences between citizen journalism and the principles of peace journalism. The 
first mentioned rely on different subjective voices that often only portray one side of the 
conflict and potentially ignore aspects beyond their prejudices (Hattotuwa, 2009: 44). Thus, 
although new media enables the voiceless to make themselves heard publicly this can at the 
same time create information overload based on biased sources. It is whether such ‘biased’ 
sources will confirm their counterpart’s understandings of them or create sympathy by giving 
access to first-hand witnessed and personal experiences.  
 
People power 
This ideal of transcending exclusionist identities at the root of violent conflicts by influencing 
public space in specific way puts into question whether ordinary people are even the most 
suitable actors to transform complex, protracted conflicts. While conflict transformation 
ideally includes all levels of society and thus recognizes ordinary people as agents for change 
it is important to keep in mind that this likewise imply different problems. As Galtung argues;  
“there are also severe problems in having the non-state system as a carrier for peace strategies. 
People, as mentioned, are not always peaceful; and even when they are, what they have at their 
disposal is mainly cultural power, not of carrots and sticks of economic and military power used 
by the state system” (Galtung 1996: 7). Conversely, one could argue that Galtung hereby 
disregard cultural power or as Castells puts it; communication power. In line with the 
thinking of Castells communication power or the shaping of people’s mind is not only an 
additional form of power but rather the very foundation of legitimizing economic, military 
and governmental authority. Particularly, in the global network society in which “media have 
become the social space where power is decided” (Castells, 2007: 238) people power has come 
to play an increasing role. As we have seen in the Arab Spring cultural power exercised 
through ICTs can be a significant factor in the generation of legitimate power. However, there 
is certainly different access and privilege to disseminate and influence public space opinions. 
Castells refers to this asymmetry as different relational capacities, or institutional dominance 
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versus resistance. This is well illustrated by for example securitization, where established 
governmental, media and military networks define necessity of exceptional measures.  
  
Another point is what Galtung refers to as people outside the political system not necessarily 
being peaceful. It is clear that citizen journalism is also used as propaganda and violence 
encouragement (Hamdy, 2010). Conclusively, people power should not be seen as the only 
way to transform a conflict but rather as an important element of the process including 
multiple forms of mediation, citizen dialogue and reconciliation. Obviously, challenging 
cultural violence and mobilizing for nonviolent action through ICTs is only steps towards 
sustainable change and “positive peace does not automatically emanate from the achievement 
of relative power balance” (Dudouet, 2011: 21). 
 
Conclusion 
First of all, a recollection of the research question;  
How can counter-power exercised through ICTs generate legitimacy and how can this contribute 
to conflict transformation in terms of mobilizing for nonviolent action and challenging cultural 
violence? 
 
Regarding the first part of the research question the uprisings in Egypt exemplify how civil 
actors might exercise counter-power through virtual spaces to generate legitimacy. The 
investigation has revealed how ICTs strengthened the possibility to mobilize, connect and 
sustain pressure on autocratic regimes through networked collective action, transforming the 
public space and connecting to global networks making new alliances and representations of 
the Egyptian people and leaders. 
 
ICTs helped transcend the collective action problem by making collective action more 
interactive, faster, safer and cheaper and allowed dissidents to connect with other like-
minded hereby challenging pluralistic ignorance. Moreover, new communication technologies 
contributed to the potential for the protesters to face and overcome fear by strengthening 
their togetherness and transferring indignation, hope, outrage and enthusiasm across 
borders.  
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The spaces of flows furthermore allowed for autonomous communication networks to 
reinforce their position by using a shared physical place as switching point to transfer ‘real 
life’ images as seen in the case of Tahrir Square. The combinations of consolidated offline 
action and mobilization with the networking through Internet created and upheld momentum 
and commitment to the cause. 
 
Even after the governmental bodies of Egypt attempted to control the situation by shutting 
down Internet connections the protesters had already connected with global networks of 
activists and companies that supported the movement providing new channels of 
communication. The connection between powerful global networks, mainstream media and 
the activists turned out to unite a strong force against Mubarak not least by shifting alliances 
through the mechanisms of ICL. 
Noticeably the protesters had an angle to their claims that was easy adoptable by 
international media. Moreover, years of offline and online networking contributed to 
autonomous communication spaces to become an integral part of regional media coverage. 
This additionally made new communication spaces more obvious sources of information for 
big media networks. 
 
Transferring this theorization to a context of conflict transformation it becomes clear that 
ICTs present new potential for challenging cultural violence and mobilizing for nonviolent 
collective action. 
 
As was the case in Egypt new media could likewise be a game-changer in relation to 
nonviolent mobilization in Palestine by providing channels to connect with global networks 
and potentially increasing their legitimacy. While there have been several attempts of 
nonviolence in Palestine throughout history they have either been destroyed by violent 
actions or simply not given sufficient attention in Western media. In this connection, new 
media provides unprecedented possibilities for Palestinians to communicate their situation to 
the world bypassing Israeli censorship. Since the Palestinians are physically divided and thus 
lack an offline place to develop collective resistance ICTs can help create new spaces for 
dissent and organization crossing the physical distance and separation. The challenges are; to 
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keep the actions nonviolent since any type of violence would delegitimize the whole project, 
and to strategically relate to how messages can be transferred in spite of media patterns in 
covering the conflict. 
 
In terms of nonviolent action Galtung suggests a framework of positive and negative 
nonviolence emphasizing the importance of the latter which implies engaging in dialogue with 
the other side and mobilizing for an inclusive vision beyond enemy images. These ideals 
however contradict the logics of mobilization and networked organization. While the network 
allows movements to share outrage and constitute alternative projects this leaderless 
structure seldom facilitates inclusive and mutual visions. On the other hand, the principles of 
a culture of peace do not necessarily imply a completely joint vision. It implies that the violent 
structures should be addressed. Not making a people the problem could avoid the alienation 
of ‘the other’.  
This principle recurs when it comes to challenging cultural violence. Tipping the balance of 
legitimacy in asymmetric power relations implies rearticulating the already established 
discourses on violence in the media. The task is to challenge enemy images and display 
nonviolent actions of passive resistance in order to come closer to changing the perception of 
‘the other’.  
Here ICTs could potentially reveal a general frustration with violent actions, though it appears 
doubtful that such disagreement is the main issue, if even an issue, in Israel-Palestine due to 
protracted history and deeply rooted structures of the conflict.  
One of the mechanisms that reinforces and upholds the structure of repression and 
domination in Israel-Palestine is securitization and the co-dependent negative identities. 
Again ICTs could provide potential for generating new discourses of de-securitisation as it 
was the case in Egypt.  
Finally new media and citizen journalism can provide significant potential for disseminating 
alternative knowledge and documenting human rights violations in order to challenge the 
legitimization of the occupation. Moreover, citizen journalism can enhance transparency and 
coherence between different levels of society. Citizen journalism have the potential to 
transcend us/them dichotomies by embracing cultural diversity through multiple messages 
but it can likewise create information overload and reinforce violent structures through 
66 
 
distributing subjective messages. While civil actors have unprecedented potential for 
exercising counter-power through new media they still have limited resources at their 
disposal and can be overruled by established powerful forces. Thus, counter-power of civil 
actors should not be the only force in conflict transformation but rather be a part of a 
multidimensional approach of mediation and reconciliation at all levels of society and in the 
region.  
 
Yet it remains to be seen; to what extent and under which circumstances ICT can provide a 
space and tool for international conflict transformation in terms of generating legitimacy 
through nonviolent action and challenging violent discourses that nurtures international 
conflict.  
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Resumé 
Dette projekt omhandler udvidelse af konflikt transformations potentiale gennem 
undersøgelse af, hvorledes civile aktører kan udøve modmagt og generere legitimitet gennem 
informations- og kommunikations teknologier (ICT).  
 
Konflikt transformation arbejder ud fra en forudsætning om, at ulige strukturer, 
diskrimination og direkte vold legitimeres og opretholdes af kulturel vold. Kulturel vold 
omfatter ideer og normer, der producerer polariserede, antagonistiske identiteter. Herved 
retfærdiggøres vold og undertrykkelse af bestemte grupper. Ikke-vold har været et af de 
teoretiske forslag til udfordring af kulturel vold og transformation af en konflikt. Inddragelse 
af civile aktører identificeres som vigtige forudsætninger for at transformere de polariserede 
identiteter, som (bl.a.) holder den undertrykkende struktur sammen. Projektets ide er, at 
ikke-vold kan styrkes af ICT ved generering af nye positioner, og herved grobund for 
konfliktparternes repositionering.  
 
Hvordan civile aktører kan påvirke legitimitet og brugen af kommunikation, er imidlertid 
underteoretiseret. Derfor benyttes Manuel Castells’ begreber om netværkssamfund og 
kommunikationsmagt som udgangspunkt for at undersøge teoretiseringer over ICT i det 
Arabiske Forår i Egypten. Optikken er: 1) hvordan mobilisering til og organisering af kollektiv 
handling gjorde brug af ICT 2) hvordan kollektiv handling gennem ICT påvirkede offentligt 
rum og mening samt 3) hvordan kollektiv handling blev understøttet af globale netværk og 
internationale alliancer. 
Undersøgelsen viser, at store medienetværk, som Al Jazeera, BBC og CNN, havde en positiv 
attitude og var villige til at bruge information fra aktivister og nye sociale medier som kilder i 
dækning af opstandene i Egypten. Dette omgik regeringskontrollen, og var med til at udbrede 
repræsentation af protesternes legitime krav og udstille styrets illegitimitet. Både sociale, 
politiske og internet netværk har over flere år samarbejdet og udbredt kritik af styret, hvilket 
skabte grobund for mobilisering og krav på legitimitet.  
 
Herefter diskuteres kulturel og ikke-vold ud fra analysens pointer i forhold til en teoretisering 
over Israel/Palæstina konflikten for at undersøge; hvilke begrænsninger og potentialer, der er 
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i forhold til ikke-vold og civile aktører, nye sociale medier og indflydelse på offentlig 
meningsdannelse/legitimitet i asymmetriske konflikter.  
Analysen viser, at en overførsel af ’stykker af virkelighed’, som f.eks. videoer af demonstranter 
der arbejder sammen på tværs af skel, kan forbinde mennesker på kryds og tværs, fordi de 
muliggør ny identifikation, indignation, men også håb idet de klart viser en anden mulig 
virkelighed. Nye sociale medier udgør er et stærkt redskab, fordi de tillader selv-
repræsentationer og overførsel af disse fra mange til mange. Understøttet af medie 
konglomerater og globale netværk som Anonymous kan de skabe et legitimitetspres på 
regeringsledere og herved skabes der mulighed for, at konfliktende ledere ompositionere sig.   
  
 
